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THE BYLINE OF EUROPE: AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS’ 
REPORTING FROM 1930 TO 1941 
 
 
Kerry J. Garvey 
133 Pages 
This thesis focuses on two of the largest foreign correspondents’ networks the one of the 
Chicago Tribune and New York Times- in prewar Europe and especially in Germany, thus 
providing a wider perspective on the foreign correspondents’ role in news reporting and, more 
importantly, how their reporting appeared in the published newspaper. It provides a new, broader 
perspective on how foreign news reporting portrayed European events to the American public. It 
describes the correspondents’ role in publishing articles over three time periods- 1930 to 1933, 
1933-1939, and 1939 to 1941. Reporting and consequently the published paper depended on the 
correspondents’ ingenuity in the relationship with the foreign government(s); their cultural 
knowledge; and their gender. All of this depended on the correspondents’ gender, cultural 
knowledge, and ingenuity. The reporters who combined them all under the right condition 
became legends in mass media and set a standard for international reporting. This standard 
influenced how mass media portrayed foreign conflicts and American’s perceptions of them 
years after the war.     
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1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: “THE RECORDING ANGELS OF THE 1930S”1 
The camera pans across a large group of foreign correspondents waiting for their chance 
to get a small moment of time with any one of the foreign leaders springing from their cars and 
rushing into another peace meeting. The year is August 1939 and Europe is on the brink of yet 
another war. The correspondents attempt to pump the leaders for any scrap of information about 
a possible war for their worried readers. One reporter stands apart from the rest of the group, 
because he physically stopped the head foreign diplomat to get the full story on the progress of 
the peace conference. In a split second, the correspondent’s conversation is cut short by a man 
in the crowd who shoots the diplomat in the head.   
The correspondent acts quickly and begins to chase the man, while all others stare in awe 
at the dying diplomat. The assassin almost gets away by swiftly hopping into a get-away car, 
however, the quick-minded foreign correspondent commandeers a friend’s car to continue the 
chase. Swish! Swish! Bullets are flying inches away from his head during the high speed chase 
with the criminal. In a blink of the eye, the criminal disappears into the countryside without a 
trace. On a slight hunch, the correspondent stumbles around in an old farm house looking for 
any sign of the criminal. He discovers the criminal discussing his conspiracy plan to influence 
the international peace meeting by faking the death of the foreign leader and torturing him for 
information. The correspondent attempts to bring the criminals to justice, however, he finds that 
the criminal enterprise infiltrates deep into the government. He must find someone to trust with 
                                                 
1
 The phrase, “Recording Angels,” comes from the opening credits of Alfred Hitchcock’s second film, Foreign 
Correspondent. See Foreign Correspondent, directed by Alfred Hitchcock, released August 16, 1940 (Hulu, July 3, 
2011), video streaming. 
2 
his exclusive information, while under the constant threat of the criminal’s assassins trying to 
silence him forever.
2
  
This was the overarching plot of Alfred Hitchcock’s movie, Foreign Correspondent 
(1940).
3
 It shows a popularized cultural image of a foreign correspondent from the 1930s and 
highlights a romanticized view of their role in foreign news reporting. Hitchcock contextualized 
his foreign correspondent within this dangerous adventure to uncover the truth for the American 
public, while other reporters stumbled around in the dark to find news. In the movie, most of the 
bad reporters sent back foreign governments’ official press releases and lived in Europe on their 
newspapers’ dollar. This movie was intended to thrill the audience; nevertheless, it brings up the 
question what type of correspondent worked in Europe during the 1930s. Was it the 
correspondent who went for the real story despite the danger? What traits defined a good 
correspondent? Could Europe have been covered by reporters simply sending governments’ 
official news back home?  Most importantly, how did the correspondents’ reporting appear in the 
newspapers for the American public?  
This thesis asks these questions with the aim of gaining a better understanding of the 
American foreign correspondents’ role in reporting on political events in Europe to the American 
public from 1930 to 1941. This is a case study that focuses on how correspondents were able to 
report from Germany. Some of the other European nations are also highlighted to help provide a 
complete picture of how the correspondents’ situation changed in relation to Europe’s political 
situation. The purpose is to shed some light on the correspondents’ reporting practices and how 
they influenced the production of news, which is a lacuna in the historiography on journalism.  
                                                 
2
 Foreign Correspondent, directed by Alfred Hitchcock, released August 16, 1940.  
3
 John Rossi argues that Hitchcock intended to use the foreign correspondents as a vehicle to show how naïve the 
American public was about the political situation in Europe. For more information on Foreign Correspondent, see 
John Rossi, “Hitchcock’s Foreign Correspondent,” Film & History 12, no. 2 (May 1982). 
3 
Most historians have been more focused on providing broad overviews of how American 
journalism developed over specific periods of time. These overviews or historical narratives 
provide a brief discussion about how the news workers and newspapers contributed to the 
development of journalism. This holds true even for historical monographs about single 
newspapers or journalists.
4
 Their analyses lack an in-depth examination of any news worker’s 
role in publishing. For example, John Maxwell Hamilton’s Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History 
of American Foreign Reporting details how the institution of foreign news reporting developed 
from the start. He used foreign correspondents as examples of how news organizations’ reporting 
changed, but has little discussion of their role in publishing the news.
5
 This creates a situation in 
which newspapers become one entity instead of comprised of multiple workers. Generally, 
historians lack this bottom up approach, because of how news workers have historically been 
studied.  
Kevin Williams argues that the historical focus has been on how the press struggles for 
political freedom, which virtually ignores their writing practices and limits any discussion on 
journalism’s impact on history.6 Therefore, a large gap developed in the historiography on how 
journalistic practices influenced events. Lea Hellmueller and Claudia Mellado argue that scholars 
“tend not to study journalistic professional roles from its impact on news content but focus on 
                                                 
4
 For examples of historians’ narratives about development of journalism see, David Paul Nord, Communities of 
Journalism: A History of American Newspapers and their Readers (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2001); Leonard Ray Teel, The Public Press, 1900-1945: The History of American Journalism (Westport, 
Conn: Praeger Publishers, 2006); and Heidi Tworek, “The Creation of European News: News Agency Cooperation 
in Interwar Europe,” Journalism Studies 14, no. 5 (2013): 730-742. For examples on how historians examined one 
newspaper and its history see Meyer Berger, The Story of the New York Times 1851-1951 (New York: Simon and 
Shuster, 1951) and Lloyd Wendt, Chicago Tribune: The Rise of a Great American Newspaper (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1979). 
5
 See John Maxwell Hamilton, Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History of American Foreign Reporting (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2009). 
6
 Kevin Williams, “War Correspondents as Sources for History: Problems and possibilities in Journalism 
Historiography,” Media History 18, no. 3-4 (2012), 341-342. 
4 
journalists’ conception of their role.”7 This is despite the fact that foreign news reporters are seen 
as gatekeeper of transnational information. Hellmueller theorized that their gatekeeper role puts 
these foreign reporters in a position of power to shape the local newspaper’s output.8 This thesis 
intends to add to the historiography by breaking with the myth that newspapers were primarily 
shaped by their owner. I adapt a bottom up approach throughout this case study, which separates 
my work from other historians’ examinations. Essentially, I am expanding the history on 
journalism by indicating the agency of journalists and the complexities involved in the making 
and shaping of the news--back then and today. 
A highly complicated system of foreign news reporting emerged in the 1930s through 
this thesis’s case study of Chicago Tribune’s and New York Times’s foreign correspondents. This 
system signals the development of a new epoch of international news reporting based on how 
these correspondents operated within it. This was developed throughout the period, because the 
correspondents had new governmental challenges for their reporting. The correspondents’ ability 
to face each of them shaped what information about Europe was provided to the American public 
at a time when the United States’ neutrality hung in the balance. 
Throughout the 1930s, these correspondents found themselves in an increasingly 
politically intense situation that affected their ability to report. The interwar period for most of 
Europe was defined by the aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression. The individual 
countries had to develop recovery plans for their respective economies, while also maintaining 
the fragile collective peace from World War I. This peace could not be maintained, because the 
European nations’ foreign policies towards one another. Richard Overy argues that most 
                                                 
7
 Lea Hellmueller and Claudia Mellado, “Professional Roles and News Construction: A Media Sociology 
Conceptualization of Journalists’ role Conception and Performance,” Communication & Society 28, no. 3 (2015): 1. 
8
 Lea Hellmueller, “Gatekeeping Beyond Geographical Borders: Developing an Analytical Model of Transnational,” 
The International Communication Gazette 79, no. 1 (2017): 3-8. 
5 
historians contribute the breakdown to the British and French appeasement policy towards 
Hitler’s demand. This lead to several cracks in the peace that eventually lead to the start of 
another war in 1939 that engulfed most of the world’s nations.9  
For the United States, the 1930s and early 1940s were defined by the question of whether 
or not to become involved with Europe’s affairs. The two sides of this debate were defined by 
the American isolationists and interventionists.
10
 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy was 
heavily influenced by the American public’s perception of the debate, because he was only able 
to be as liberal as the willingness of the American public to be involved with Europe. This debate 
and FDR’s foreign policy changed over the course of the period, because events, such as Great 
Britain possible defeat by Nazi Germany, changed some of the American public’s point of 
view.
11
 More importantly, the information about Europe available to the American public would 
have influenced their attitudes towards either side of the debate and FDR’s foreign policy.  
By the 1930s, American journalism was firmly interested in international news coverage. 
Many newspaper owners saw it has a new market, which had the potential to liven up the news 
and, more importantly, be profitable. There was no shortage of journalists wanting to go abroad 
and live an exciting life in Europe. The ones in 1930s were unique from the previous waves, 
because many of them were college educated. By the 1920s, some schools started to provide 
                                                 
9
 Richard Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 3
rd
 ed., Seminar Studies in History, (Harlow, England and 
London: Pearson Longman, 2008), 4-10. 
10
 For more information on how FDR interacted with isolationists and interventionists see Wayne Cole, Roosevelt & 
the Isolationists 1932-1945 (Lincoln and London: University, 1988) and Wayne Cole, America First: The Battle 
Against Intervention 1940-1941 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1953). For more information on how 
interventionists operated in the United States see Andrew Johnstone, Against Immediate Evil: American 
Internationalists and the Four Freedoms on the Eve of World War II (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2014). 
11
 Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman, FDR and the Jews (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 3-5. Breitman and Lichtman focus their discussion on how 
FDR changed his foreign policy on his actions towards the Jewish situation in Germany. Justus D. Doenecke’s and 
John E. Wilz’s is one of the latest books that discusses the implications of key events in Europe and Asia from 1931 
to 1941 on the United States entry into the war see From Isolation to War 1931-1941, 4
th
 ed., The American History 
Series (Arlington, Ill: Wiley Blackwell, 2015). 
6 
courses in journalism to accommodate the growing field. The most notable schools were 
University of Missouri and Columbia University.
12
 It is important to note that many of the 
foreign correspondents highlighted in this case study did not receive an education in journalism. 
Many of these correspondents were already reporting before these programs were largely 
instituted at the university level, but most of them were college educated.   
All across Europe, these correspondents observed crucial political events that led to 
World War II and reported back to their American newspapers. A handful of them reported on 
the events in Germany that were central to the start of the war. The correspondents were at least 
partially responsible for the information published about Germany in major newspapers to the 
American public and created one of the few windows into these events. The rest of the duty laid 
with the newspaper owners and their editors who placed and shaped correspondents’ reporting 
within the papers.  
Foreign reporting has been a long tradition in newspapers dating back to the early 1900s; 
however, few of them could afford networks large enough to cover all of Europe. It was not until 
the 1920s and 1930s that several major newspapers developed extensive foreign correspondent 
networks.
13
 Some of well-known news services were Chicago Daily News, New York Herald 
Tribune, New York World, and the Philadelphia Public Ledger- New York Evening Post. The 
freelance services were the Associated Press, United Press, and Hearst’s International News 
Service. Two of the largest syndicated news services that emerged by the 1930s were the 
Chicago Tribune and New York Times, which had foreign correspondent networks covering most 
                                                 
12
 Morrell Heald, Transatlantic Vistas: American Journalists in Europe 1900-1940 (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State 
University Press, 1988), 4-16.  
13
 Heald, Transatlantic Vistas, 2-5. For information on how American newspapers in general developed during this 
time period see Leonard Ray Teel, The Public Press, 1900-1945, The History of American Journalism (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2006).  
7 
of Europe.
14
 Some of their correspondents’ citizenship were not American; however, I classified 
them as American journalists based on the audience of their reporting. This thesis seeks to 
understand American foreign news reporting by exploring how foreign correspondents from the 
Chicago Tribune and New York Times reported on European political events from 1930 to 1941; 
it is a collective biography of sorts.   
I focus on the Chicago Tribune and New York Times, because of their owners’ unique 
perspectives on the political events in Europe, their network of foreign correspondents across 
Europe, and their similar daily circulation of at least 500,000.
15
 The Chicago Tribune was owned 
by the charismatic Robert McCormick. He was a well-known isolationist, who voiced his disdain 
for Franklin D. Roosevelt’s domestic and foreign policies through his newspaper.16 The New 
York Times was owned by Arthur Hays Sulzberger, who came from a German Jewish family. He 
was not highly politicized as either an isolationist or interventionist like McCormick, but he did 
recognize the plight of Jews. It is important to note that Sulzberger made an effort for The Times 
not to be labeled as a Jewish newspaper, but to be recognized for its reporting alone.
17
 Therefore, 
these owners had different opinions on how the United States should address the events 
unfolding in Europe.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the media owners shaped their newspaper’s reporting by placing 
pressure on the editors and reporters through the threat of unemployment. This threat was 
                                                 
14
 For more information on the history of American foreign news reporting see Hamilton, Journalism’s Roving Eye, 
192-217. 
15
 By the end of the 1930s, the Chicago Tribune’s daily circulation passed 900,000. For more information, see 
Wendt, Chicago Tribune, 599-600. The New York Times had about 500,000 for its daily circulation in the 1930s. For 
a breakdown see Berger, The Story of The York Times 1851-1951, 569-570.  
16
 Jerome E. Edwards, The Foreign Policy of Col. McCormick’s Tribune 1929-1941 (Reno, Nevada: University of 
Nevada Press, 1971), 1-3. For a biography on Colonel Robert McCormick see Richard Norton Smith, The Colonel: 
The Life and Legend of Robert R. McCormick 1880-1955 (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1997). 
17
 Laurel Leff, Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America’s Most Important Newspapers (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13-14. A biography does not exist about Arthur Hays Sulzberger. For a history 
of the New York Times prior and during his tenure as publisher see Meyer Berger, The Story of the New York Times 
1851-1951 (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1951). 
8 
generally effective, especially in the 1930s with the Great Depression, because the journalists 
were viewed as “replaceable cogs” in the news reporting system. This mentality developed in the 
technological advancement age of the 19
th
 century, because reporting became highly efficient 
which separated the newsroom workers into two divisions, reporters and editors.
18
 This allowed 
the owners to easily change or write off stories based on their agenda. Furthermore, the reporters 
were not paid a livable wage which forced many of them to get second jobs or completely leave 
the profession. The remaining reporters developed a sense of comradery, because they viewed 
their job as important source of information for the general public’s knowledge. This drove some 
of the reporters in the 1930s to fight against their owners’ wishes.19  
The New York Times and Chicago Tribune owners had somewhat of a challenge to 
achieve the correspondents’ acquiescence on the account of their distinctive and sometime larger 
than life personalities. These newspapers were home to some of the most famous foreign 
correspondents across all of Europe. For example, the Chicago Tribune had Sigrid Schultz 
reporting from Germany from 1919 to 1941, who earned the nickname “dragon lady from 
Chicago” from the Nazis, because of her ruthless, observant reporting in Berlin and her strong 
anti-Nazism.
20
 The New York Times also had several correspondents in Germany. One of their 
reporters, Otto Tolischus, wrote a stream of negative articles about Germany, and while his 
articles ended up in the back of the Times, they also led to his expulsion from Germany by the 
Nazis.
21
 These reporters are only a fraction of the many who will be discussed throughout this 
                                                 
18
 Bonnie Brennen, “Cultural Discourse of Journalists: The Material Conditions of Newsroom Labor,” in 
Newsworkers: Towards a History of the Rank and File, ed. Hanno Hardt and Bonnie Brennen (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 97-99. 
19
 Brennen, “Cultural Discourse of Journalists,” 101-104. 
20
 Frederick S. Voss, Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press for National Portrait Gallery, 1994), 3-5, 8. 
21
 Leff, Buried in the Times, 55-56, 61-62.  
9 
paper. Generally, I focus on the correspondents who reported on Germany, because of its 
centrality to events in Europe during the 1930s and they provide a base of analysis for this thesis.  
A limited number of historical studies exists on how the printed media and foreign 
reporters portrayed events in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s. The norm among them has 
been to write short biographies of famous foreign correspondents or on how individual 
newspapers and/or journalists reported on events predominantly in Germany.
22
 This thesis differs 
from these historians by contextualizing foreign correspondents’ reporting and actions in their 
respective situations. Morrell Heald’s Transatlantic Vistas American Journalists in Europe is 
one of the few books that focuses solely on how foreign correspondents in Europe reported on 
news. He examines how the well-known correspondents from the Chicago Daily News and some 
famous freelancers were able to report from Europe between 1900 to 1940. Heald suggests that 
the correspondents took on a new European perspective in their reporting because of their tenure 
in Europe. Therefore, their reporting provided an angle on Europe that domestic journalists could 
not take.
23
 Heald’s conclusion is not wrong for these select correspondents. Nevertheless, there 
were multitude of news organizations with plenty of foreign correspondents in Europe during the 
1930s and not all of them had the same experiences in Europe.  
Case studies of other newspapers and correspondents would shed more light on the 
foreign correspondents’ role in news reporting; however, not many exist especially for the 
1930s.
24
 Theodore Edward Kruglak’s The Foreign Correspondents: A Study of the Men and 
                                                 
22
 For an example of how historians wrote foreign correspondents’ biographies see Voss, Reporting the War. For an 
example of historians focusing on events in Germany see Leff, Buried by the Times and Deborah E. Lipstadt, 
Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust 1933-1945 (New York & Toronto: The Free 
Press, 1986) For an example of how historians studied individual correspondents’ reporting in Europe from 1900 to 
1940, see Heald, Transatlantic Vistas. 
23
 Heald, Transatlantic Vistas, 224-225, 231-234. 
24
 For examples of case studies about news reporting in 1930s and World War II see Jacob Kreutzfeldt, 
“Unidentified Sounds: Radio Reporting From Copenhagen 1931-1949,” Journal of Radio & Audio Media 22, no. 1 
(2015): 3-19; Heidi J.S. Tworek, “Journalistic Statesmanship: Protecting the Press in Weimar Germany and 
10 
Women Reporting for the American Information Media in Western Europe (1974) is one of the 
first monographs that studies foreign correspondents reporting. However, much of his conclusion 
is based on statistical analyses of their articles in the newspaper, thus, ignoring the 
correspondents’ situation.25 This lack of analysis does not change in the historiography, because 
historians are more focused on news agencies instead of their workers. Case in point, Heidi 
Tworek’s article, “The Creation of European News: News Agency Cooperation in Interwar 
Europe,” (2013) describes how news agencies changed their “mechanisms” to foster 
international news exchange after World War I. She is focusing on the large global structures of 
news reporting instead of how reporters operated within them.
26
  
There are also a few case studies on how newspapers reported on specific events from 
Germany in the 1930s; yet, they do not focus solely on foreign correspondents. Laurel Leff’s 
Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America’s Most Important Newspaper (2005) is one of 
the most extensive case studies on the New York Times. This monograph provides a detailed 
study on how the New York Times portrayed Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. She argues that 
the US government was not entirely at fault for the misinformation given to the American public 
and that the New York Times had some autonomy on how it reported the news. She also suggests 
that, since the owner and publisher of the Times, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, came from a German 
Jewish family; he avoided highlighting the German Jewish plight. This would keep his paper 
from being written off as only a Jewish newspaper.
27
 Ultimately, Leff’s monograph and similar 
                                                                                                                                                             
Abroad,” German History 32, no. 4 (2014): 559-578; Brianna Buljung, “From the Foxhole: American Newsmen and 
the Reporting of World War II,” International Social Science Review 86, no. 1-1 (2011): 44-64.  
25
 Theodore Edward Kruglak, The Foreign Correspondents: A Study of the Men and Women Reporting for the 
American Information Media in Western Europe (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974). 
26
 Heidi Tworek, “The Creation of European News: News Agency Cooperation in Interwar Europe,” Journalism 
Studies 14, no. 5 (2013): 730-742. 
27
 Leff, Buried in the Times, 8-14. Gary Klein’s article “When the News Doesn’t Fit: The New York Times and Hitler’s 
First Two Months in Office, February/ March 1933” is another example of a how a historian uses the Times as a 
case study for reporting in Nazi Germany. Klein argues that the Times did not have efficient enough bureau to report 
11 
ones are only focusing on how one newspaper and its owner influenced reporting on one aspect 
of the war. This creates a rather limited window into newspapers’ and correspondents’ writing. 
My thesis’ boarder timeline and more general focus on reporting from Germany, thus adds an 
important facet to this historiography. 
Another example is Harriet Scharnberg’s article about the Associated Press’s interactions 
with the Nazi government. Scharnberg’s article, “Das A und P Der Propaganda: Associated 
Press und die nationalsozialistishch Bildpublizistik,” examines how the American international 
news organization, Associated Press, was able to continue its reporting from Berlin until 1941. 
Scharnberg suggests that AP submitted to the German Editorial Control Law in 1935 in order to 
gain press privileges in Germany. This law required the news organization to provide photos of 
America for Nazis’ propaganda purpose in exchange for remaining in Germany.28 Scharnberg 
analyzes how this specific news organization interacted with the Nazis, but does not provide an 
analysis on how the reporting appeared in newspapers. Thus, the general information provided to 
the American public about Europe’s political situation remains unexamined.  
The only other material on this period of media history is by the foreign correspondents 
themselves. Many of the correspondents wrote autobiographies and critical examinations of their 
experiences abroad.
29
 The sheer number of books written by them testifies to the level of self-
importance they had about their experiences during and after the war. Sigrid Schultz, for 
example, wrote a book published in 1944 on how Germany would attempt to wage war yet 
                                                                                                                                                             
successfully the true nature of the Nazi Party in their first two months at office. Ultimately, he criticizes the Times 
for not having foresight about the Nazi party in early 1933 and focuses more on editorials then the foreign 
correspondents themselves. See Gary Klein, “When the News Doesn’t Fit: The New York Times and Hitler’s First 
Two Months in Office, February/ March 1933,” J&MC Quarterly 78, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 127-149. 
28
 Harriet Scharnberg, “Das A und P Der Propaganda: Associated Press und die nationalsozialistishch 
Bildpublizistik,” Studies in Contemporary History (2016), accessed April 3, 2016, http://www.zeithistorishche-
forschungen.de/1-2016/id%3D5324. 
29
 For a short list of foreign correspondents’ books see Heald, Transatlantic Vista, 270-272.  
12 
again.
30
 Another Chicago Tribune reporter, Donald Day, wrote an extensive testimonial on how 
his reports were censored during the second World War.
31
 Ultimately, these books can only be 
taken as the author’s opinion of what happened instead of fact. Many of them were written after 
the correspondents returned from Europe. But, they do provide a window for current historians to 
understand how the correspondents viewed events in Europe and possibly functioned within their 
respective countries.  
Consequently, the historiography on foreign news reporting is missing the larger picture 
of how foreign correspondents were able to communicate the news to their respective 
newspapers in this time period. The correspondents’ methods of reporting are as important as the 
articles themselves, because they dictate what type of stories can be sent back to the newspapers. 
Thus, correspondents’ choice of reporting methods is the foundation for any story in a 
newspaper. Most historians have avoid exploring this historical question, because it requires a 
detailed examination of correspondents across Europe. This lack of historical analysis has largely 
left the news workers absent from any discussion on the history of journalism.
32
 An examination 
of foreign correspondents’ role in publishing articles from Europe starts to break down the idea 
that newspapers were solely driven by owners. 
This thesis cannot examine all foreign correspondents stationed in Europe during the 
1930s and 1940s. Such an examination would lack detailed analysis of the correspondents’ 
reporting. My case study, therefore, focuses into two of the largest foreign correspondents’ 
network directed by Chicago Tribune and New York Times, thus providing a wider perspective 
                                                 
30
 Sigrid Schultz, Germany Will Try Again (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1944). 
31
 Donald Day, Onward Christian Soldiers: 1920-1942: Propaganda, Censorship and One Man’s Struggle to 
Herald the Truth (Torrance, Calif: Noontide Press, 1982). 
32
 Hanno Hardt, “Without the Rank and File: Journalism History, Media Workers, and Problems of Representation,” 
in Newsworkers: Towards a History of the Rank and File, ed. Hanno Hardt and Bonnie Brennen (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 2. 
13 
on the foreign correspondents’ roles in news reporting and, more importantly, how their 
reporting appeared in the published newspaper. Therefore, my thesis provides a new, broader 
perspective on how foreign news reporting portrayed European events to the American public 
and starts to expand the history of journalism to include news workers.  
This broader perspective helps to define more than the foreign correspondents’ role in 
reporting the news from the 1930s to early 1940s. Hanno Hardt asserts that media historians have 
not explored “the relationship between media and change in American society and to analyze the 
role of individual actors, such as reporters, in this cultural and political process.”33 This thesis 
explores how these correspondents set the tone for foreign reporting decades later. Each one of 
these reporters had some impact on how a reporter interacted with foreign governments to get the 
entire story about political, social, and economic events. All of this depended on the 
correspondents’ gender, cultural knowledge, and ingenuity. The reporters who combined them 
all under the right condition became legends in mass media and set a standard for international 
reporting. This standard influenced how mass media portrayed foreign conflicts and the 
American perceptions of them years after the war.     
I explore this broader perspective on foreign reporting through the Chicago Tribune’s and 
New York Times’s company archives. In the last 40 years, the Chicago Tribune made the papers 
of Colonel Robert McCormick open to the public. His papers contain a wealth of documents, 
such as letters and telegrams from all of their correspondents between 1914 to 1955. Most of 
these documents were about correspondents’ issues with reporting or McCormick’s request for 
stories and reports on conditions in their respective countries, thus, providing insights into how 
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Tribune’s correspondents interacted with the company and their possible reporting conditions.34 
The New York Times archive contains similar documents about their foreign correspondents; 
however, many of them focused on the daily routine of its Berlin News Bureau.
35
 Lastly, the 
Sigrid Schultz Papers are a crucial source since the collection contains all of Schultz’s personal 
papers during her years of reporting in Germany.
36
 Her papers have valuable details on how she 
survived as a journalist in Germany throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Ultimately, all of these 
documents provide context to the main source of thesis, the published articles in the Chicago 
Tribune and New York Times.
37
 
I approach this material in a systematic fashion in order to analyze the foreign 
correspondents’ role in news reporting without simply recounting all of their stories. There are 
other ways of approaching this material, such as examining the newspapers’ editorials; however, 
the focus would then not have been on the correspondents’ actions and concrete situations. In 
each of the chapters, I analyze how the correspondents in Germany reported on significant 
events, under what conditions might have affected their reporting, and how their respective 
newspapers published their articles. Subsequently, I discuss in the same manner correspondents 
who may have reported on Germany, but resided outside of its borders. This is to explain any 
possible regional difference in reporting besides the fact they were outside of Germany’s 
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borders. Lastly, I compare how individual reporters were able to communicate their news to their 
respective papers and what it meant for the American public.
38
  
Based on the newspapers’ articles and foreign correspondents’ papers, I argue that the 
correspondents’ reporting in published newspapers was a product of a highly intricate system of 
information distribution from Europe to the media outlets of the United States. Some of the 
European nations wanted to have total control over the flow of information and used tactics such 
as censoring communication, expelling troublesome correspondents from their countries, or 
limiting press briefings. The correspondents had to learn how to avoid issues with the European 
governments, while being able to send accurate news back home. However, the amount of 
information published was dependent on the opinions and political leanings of editors and 
newspaper owners. They were the ones who blended all of the articles together in order to 
present a coherent source of information for the American public and thus directly affected the 
narrative of the war.  The main question for this thesis is what image of Europe was published in 
these newspapers based on the foreign correspondents’ ability to work within both sides of this 
information system, the one in Europe and the one once their articles reached the United States. 
I approach this question by examining how correspondents across Europe examine 
significant events relating to Germany over the course of three chapters. The first chapter argues 
that correspondents were already facing some governmental censorship in Germany by 1930. It 
also shows how the editors did not assign a lot of importance to articles from Germany. The 
second chapter describes how these new press rules became harsher from 1933 to 1939. It 
becomes apparent that after the Nazis consolidated in their power from 1933 to 1934, the press 
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had to work under different rules. In many of the cases, the correspondents’ reporting became 
directly connected with their safety.  
The final chapter starts when the German army invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. 
The invasion changed the entire situation for foreign correspondents, because most of them were 
now reporting from a war zone. The correspondents had to make a choice about how far they 
were willing to risk their safety in order to report a story. This time period ends on December 11, 
1941 when Germany declared war on the United States, which altered the entire situation for all 
correspondents in Europe once again. Ultimately, it ushered in the new journalistic era of 
governmental press and censorship.  
  
17 
CHAPTER II  
THE JOURNALISTIC EVALUATION OF HITLER’S INTENT FROM 1930 TO 1934 
 “There is no better way to avoid unfriendly propaganda than to let the press have free 
play. If stories appear censored people will believe propaganda.”  
-Geo Scharschug (Cable Editor for the Chicago Tribune)
39
 
In the early 1930s, the Chicago Tribune’s foreign correspondent for Germany, Sigrid 
Schultz, and many other American correspondents realized that governmental censorship and 
expulsion were work hazards for any foreign reporters in Germany. On November 23, 1932, 
Schultz wrote a letter to Colonel Robert McCormick explaining how she had death threats in 
anonymous letters and a summons by the German Foreign Office Ministry, because of how she 
described Franz von Papen’s actions in the newspaper. More importantly, the authors of the 
letters were upset about her lack of understanding Hitler’s greatness in her articles for the 
Chicago Tribune. She recalled how she warded off the government’s attempt to expel her by 
stating to the German official, “he was losing his time threatening me with expulsion, since my 
expulsion would make a dramatic story and leave no doubt in anybody’s mind that Germany was 
run by Junker government.”40 Schultz’s statement showed that she had immense confidence that 
her position in Germany was secure. However, not all journalists were secure in their position 
nor had the power to protect themselves from their host governments. 
This happened at the time when all of Europe and the United States were dealing with the 
fallout from the American stock market crash in October of 1929 and the collapse of the 
international trading market. The Western leaders were trying to keep their respective countries 
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from falling completely into economic and political chaos. This led to most of the Western 
governments to withdraw from international politics at the start of the 1930s in order to address 
the economic fallout within their respective countries. Germany was hit particularly hard by the 
economic slump from the stock crash. The United States had heavily invested in Germany prior 
to the 1930s in order to help its economy and the rest of Europe recover from World War I, but 
the loans started to dry up at the beginning of 1930. Thus, Germany was thrown into dire 
economic troubles with no visible signs of improvement for the German people. Coupled with 
the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic, this led to the rise of radical nationalist groups, such as 
the Nazi party.
41
 
March 27, 1930 marked the beginning of the Weimar Republic’s downfall in Germany. 
This was the day that the moderate coalition broke apart, because the government could not 
agree how to move forward with the failing economy. Since no political party could gain a 
majority in the Reichstag, Germany was thrown into political chaos from 1930 to 1933. This 
allowed the ultra-conservative right political parties to gain more influence in the government. 
Much of this can be contributed to their position of influence over President Hindenburg. This 
gave them the ability to push the President to use presidential decrees in order to drive Germany 
towards more of an authoritarian government. The various decrees took most of the power away 
from the Reichstag and invested it into the presidency, but still allowed Germany to masquerade 
as a democracy.
42
 This helped to set the stage in 1933 for the Nazis to destroy all of the other 
political parties, to form a coalition with the army, and to take the power away from Reichstag. 
This set Germany on the path to be a one party state. Hindenburg was the only person that stood 
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in the Nazis’ way of having complete control; however, he had little recourse to stop the Nazi 
Party.
43
  
When the Nazis began to gain power between 1930 and 1933, the American foreign 
correspondents found themselves increasingly watched and pressured by the German 
government and even in some cases, the United States’ government, to censor their reporting.44 
The journalists soon realized that they could not simply send stories from Germany, because of 
the possible repercussions from the German government. These journalists had to make a choice 
on how far they were willing to risk their careers and positions in Germany to send their 
uncensored articles. In contrast, the other journalists in Europe faced, at most, communication 
difficulties from their newspaper’s shrinking budget and some governmental monitoring of cable 
services. Most of these problems were solved by changing communication services, which had 
no real impact on their reporting. Ultimately, the Chicago Tribune’s and New York Times’s 
foreign correspondents across Europe did not face the same difficulties in reporting the news, 
which influenced what articles were sent back to the newspapers from 1930 to 1933. The factor 
that defined the correspondents’ reporting was their reaction to the press changes by their host 
government. 
At the start of 1931, foreign correspondents were gradually affected by new 
governmental press rules that attempted to influence and control their reporting back to the 
United States. This forced them to become creative with their communication methods to send 
relevant and uncensored articles back home, while at the same time abiding their hosts’ 
governmental press rules in order to remain welcome in its borders. The foreign correspondents 
had to make a choice on how far they were willing to go for truth, while Europe was engulfed 
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into political issues. Essentially, not all correspondents were willing to push their luck as far as 
Sigrid Schultz in Germany in order to send their articles back home. Their individual answers 
defined what sort of information was provided to their editors and, subsequently, to the general 
American public in their daily newspapers.  
I investigate this first by analyzing how the Chicago Tribune Berlin correspondent and 
then the New York Times Berlin correspondents functioned in Germany from 1930 to about 
1932. The following sections examines the brief transitional period for these journalists, while 
the Nazis consolidated their power from 1933 to 1934. The correspondents’ reactions are again 
highlighted by first examining the Chicago Tribune Berlin correspondent and then the Times 
correspondents. The main intention is to show the increasing difficulties that foreign 
correspondents encountered in Germany.   
 The Berlin News Bureau has often been defined as a challenge or near impossible 
assignments for foreign correspondents after Hitler and the Nazi Party consolidated power in 
Germany between 1933 and 1934.
45
 However, the foreign correspondents had difficulties with 
their reporting even before, as the German government kept a watchful eye over media in order 
to protect its image in Germany and in the world.
46
 Bernhard Fulda argues that these restrictions 
were an attempt to keep the media from undermining the legitimacy of the government through 
their partisan reporting.
47
 However, little is known about how the German government dealt with 
foreign correspondents before the Nazis. 
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The experience of Chicago Tribune’s Berlin correspondent, Sigrid Schultz, represents 
how the Weimar Republic attempted to shape the foreign correspondents’ reporting, because her 
reporting in the early 1930s brought her into conflict with the German government. More 
importantly, her conflicts with the German government showed that the foreign correspondents’ 
writing became enough of an issue for governmental restriction and regulation by the end of 
1931. This means that the German government already began centralizing governmental control 
over information and the press at least one year before the Nazis gained full control over 
Germany.  
 Sigrid Schultz was uniquely qualified to cover Germany as a reporter, because most of 
her childhood and adult life was spent in Europe. When she was eight years old, her family 
moved from Chicago to France in 1901, because her father was a famous portrait painter in 
Europe. Most of her education took place in French schools and her father encouraged Schultz to 
become fluent in French, German, English, and Norwegian. He also personally schooled her in 
European upper class culture.
48
 Eventually, the entire Schultz family moved to her father’s studio 
in Germany just before World War I broke out across Europe. The family was treated as possible 
foreign hostiles throughout the entire war, which required them to check in daily with the local 
German police. Schultz became the sole financial provider during the war, because her father 
was extremely ill and the demand for portrait paintings diminished. She was able to find work as 
a translator for foreign diplomats residing in Germany. This position provided an opportunity for 
her to meet and to form relationships with important diplomats and journalists, which paved the 
way for her to become one of the most knowledgeable journalists in Berlin.
49
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Her war job helped her to gain work as a translator for Richard Little, a Chicago Tribune 
foreign correspondent, who was temporarily reporting on the war’s aftermath in Germany. He 
was impressed with her work to the point where he offered her a job as a foreign reporter for the 
Chicago Tribune in Germany.
50
 By 1926, Schultz was in charge of the entire Berlin News 
Bureau for the Chicago Tribune; she was one of the first women given such a responsibility.
51
 
She rose quickly through the media ranks, because her education and cultural knowledge gave 
her the tools to understand events in Germany on a better cultural level than most other reporters 
from the United States.  
 Schultz was not the only correspondent who spent an extensive period of time in Europe 
or in Germany. There were still plenty of veteran reporters from the 1920s, such as Larry Rue, on 
the Chicago Tribune’s foreign staff. However, she was one of the few foreign correspondents 
who received a “byline” or authorship credit for her stories and spent most of her life in Europe. 
This does not mean that the other correspondents were not important. They did not receive a 
byline for their articles and were simply labeled as Chicago Tribune Press Service. These articles 
have no indication of ownership, which makes it near impossible to identify who wrote them. 
Most likely, Schultz received a byline, because of her natural abilities as a journalist. She had all 
of her fathers’ contacts across Europe from his years as a painter for the wealthy Europeans, 
which provided an extremely wide base of informants and sources for her reporting. She also 
understood events from more of a European perspective. Thus, Schultz was in a good position to 
adapt and maneuver around the press regulations in Germany throughout the 1930s.  
 Hitler and the Nazi Party started to make it into Sigrid Schultz’s reporting beginning in 
1930, because of their political success in the Reichstag election in September of 1930. The 
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Nazis gained almost 100 seats in the Reichstag, which made it a strong political force and, 
subsequently, they announced themselves as one to Germany and the rest of the world.
52
 A 
political party did not necessarily gain public notoriety by merely gaining seats in the Reichstag 
though. Case in point, not all foreign correspondents recognized Hitler and the Nazi party as a 
serious political threat, even with the large increase of seats. Many of the correspondents either 
briefly mentioned their presence in Germany or ignored them from 1930 to 1933. Schultz was 
one of the few who found Hitler troubling enough to provide warnings in her reporting. 
 By the end of 1932, she had written about 166 articles for the Chicago Tribune on 
Hitler’s and the Nazi Party’s rise in political power.53 She was one of the only Chicago Tribune 
correspondents who wrote about them from 1930 to 1932 at all.
54
 Early on, she reported that 
Hitler was more of a political nuisance with only some prospects of political strength. This 
changed between 1931 and 1932, because Hitler became a political threat towards the German 
government after gathering more political power from German public’s support. In reaction, the 
government enforced press regulations to curb Hitler’s influence on the German public. The 
government thought by minimizing his interaction with the public it would stop or diminish his 
political power.
55
 Therefore, the press had limited interactions with Hitler, but Schultz was not 
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hampered by these rules. She was able to get a rare interview with Hitler on December 5, 1931 
and provided some early insight into Hitler as German leader to the American public.
56
  
Sigrid Schultz’s early awareness of Hitler can be seen in her letters and reporting in 1930, 
which showed signs of a highly critical attitude towards him. She wrote a letter to Colonel 
McCormick on October 29, 1930, in which she described her opinion of Hitler and his current 
political stance. In the letter, she referred to Hitler as a “fascist bugbear” and poor at 
outmaneuvering the communists party in the Reichstag.
57
 Schultz suggested that Hitler did 
neither have the numbers in his party nor the ability to influence how the Reichstag operated in 
1930, because the Communists outmaneuvered them with their 77 votes. She went on to describe 
how Hitler was only as dangerous as the last man who spoke to him, because that person directed 
his thoughts and ideas towards the audience. She thought that the German voters would start to 
question Hitler’s political motivations, because he had an erratic message in his speeches.58 Her 
description of Hitler suggests that he was more of a nuisance with only some political power and 
influence, but possessed very little political skill to inflict any serious damage to Germany or to 
the rest of the world. 
It is also important to note that Schultz was most likely free to write and report about any 
event in 1930 based on the letter. She did not write about press censorship or German 
governmental pressure for her to spin any articles. This is supported by her discussion of sources 
in her letter to McCormick, because she provided a lot of information about them and even 
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though she did not mention their full names. She described their occupations and what 
information was given to her, which leads one to think she had no worry about the letter being 
read by German government officials and possible backlash. For example, she stated that 
German Chancellor Heinrich Brüning’s secretary showed her a secret report given to German 
industrialists in order to help their trade negotiations with the Russians.
59
 She also discussed that 
Hitler’s confidential aid told her Hitler found a legal loophole for him to get German citizenship 
even with being born in Austria.
60
 This sheer lack of vague language about her sources coupled 
with her negative comments about Hitler and her discussion of Brüning’s governmental plans 
indicates that she had the ability to write freely about Germany for the time being.  
 It should be kept in mind that this letter was written in October of 1930 and early on in 
Hitler’s rise to power. This was a time when no one knew the full extent of his potential for 
destruction and chaos, which meant there was little need for press regulations against him. Hitler 
also lacked the authority to enforce his will on the press. Schultz’s commentary on Hitler showed 
her contempt for his political ideas with some concern about what he could do in Germany. This 
concern about Hitler’s actions and potential political power remained a constant in her reporting, 
especially in the early 1930s. A couple of months before she sent the letter to Colonel 
McCormick, she had already written several articles about Hitler’s rise to political power.61 
Schultz’s reporting should reflect this strong negative attitude towards the Nazis in her letter, 
however, the Tribune’s editors changed her work and distorted her early insights on Hitler.  
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 Most of her articles after the Reichstag election in September of 1930 focused on how 
the existing German government began to address Hitler and his promises as a political threat for 
Germany’s future. These articles remained largely off the front page in 1930 expect for an 
announcement about the Reichstag election results on September 15, 1930.
62
 There was also a 
front page article on December 4 that discussed the political reaction to the fights between the 
unemployed and Berlin police.
63
 The other articles had one of the earliest warnings that Hitler 
and the Nazis party had potential for destruction; however, they were published in the bulk of the 
paper. The reason for this cannot be fully explained, because of the lack of sources about editors. 
Most likely, it can be attributed to Nazi activism not being important enough for the front pages 
of American newspapers--nor should it have been at this early stage. The Nazis were simply a 
source of political tension and of some chaos for the Weimar government.  
For example, her article about the Reichstag election and its aftermath was published on 
page five of the newspaper on September 16, 1930.
64
 At this time, the Communists, Nationalist 
Socialist Party (Nazis), and other German political parties were in a political battle for control 
over the Reichstag and Germany’s future.65 The Nazi party and Communist party (KPD) also 
gained a large number of seats in the Reichstag, which required any governmental coalition to 
include them. This created a political dilemma for Germany, because the Nazi and Communist 
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party were on the opposite sides of the political spectrum. This meant a coalition was impossible 
as there were too many political parties on the fringe.
66
  
Schultz’s article highlighted this political dilemma in Germany to the American public. 
She discussed how the Communists and Nationalist Socialist Party differed over political ideals. 
She also explained that this meant any attempt by the National Socialist party to form a coalition 
government would be opposed by their political enemies in the Center and DNVP.
67
 She even 
described how President Von Hindenburg picked a side through his statement, “let it be known 
tonight that he would fight to the last ditch any attempt of the Hiterlites to usurp power.”68 
Schultz’s article suggest that the two political parties would not agree on anything and attack 
each other’s political agendas and be source of tension.69  
Another one of Schultz’s article about the German political situation published on 
October 13, 1930 also received similar treatment by it being placed on page four of the 
newspaper. She reported that the German political parties were resorting to violence in order to 
secure their respective position of power. In early October, the German Social Democrats held a 
demonstration to show the “fascists” their level of strength. According to the article, this 
demonstration was led by Dr. Paul Loebe, the Social Democratic President of the Reichstag. This 
erupted into fist fights on the street and the police arrested 38 people. Schultz also reported that 
the “fascists” reacted to the fighting by defying the Prussian laws and wearing their brown shirts 
in the Reichstag.
70
 A clear indication of political unrest was emerging from Germany in 
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Schultz’s reporting; however, the page placement showed that Chicago Tribune’s editors thought 
that other news, such as New York gang violence, was more important at the time.
71
  
  This early political unrest helped Hitler to gain massive popular support among the 
middle-class voters by the beginning of 1932. These voters were becoming more radicalized and 
discontented with the Weimar Republic, because of its failure to improve the low standard of 
living.
72
 Schultz’s interview with Hitler in December of 1931 is an illustrative case of her early 
anxiety over his growing political power. In the article, she introduced him as “the ‘bogey man’ 
of Germany’s finances” and “leader of the National Socialists, otherwise known as fascists.”73 
These terms are not typically used to describe a possible future leader that wants peace and 
prosperity. In fact, it almost projected a sense that Hitler could be a nightmare for at least 
Germany. Schultz’s interview and description of Hitler are almost acting as an initial warning to 
the US citizens about Hitler’s true intent for Germany’s future. 
Schultz supported this portrayal in the interview by discussing how the Nazi party was 
the strongest political party in Germany and how it gave Hitler immense confidence in himself. 
Schultz went as far as stating, “Hitler is convinced that absolute power will be his in Germany in 
the course of a year at the latest.” She even used the subtitles such as “Nazi Chief Predicts He’ll 
be in Power Soon” and “My Will Be Done.”74 This may not have been intentional, but with the 
last subtitle Schultz made a reference to the Lord’s Prayer, possibly creating an image of Hitler 
as thinking of himself like a god. This was made worse when she coupled it with his quote, “The 
communists are the scourge of nations. The war we are carrying on is not a platonic war, it is a 
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bloody one.”75 Schultz may not have intended this for her interview to be an early warning, but it 
painted Hitler as a strong political presence in Germany who was obsessed with gaining more 
power by any means necessary. Unfortunately, the interview was tucked away on page three of 
the newspaper next to a story about two sets of twins being born. The placement makes it more 
of a human interest story instead of a serious analysis of potential leader of Germany. 
Schultz’s conclusion is the polar opposite to the other famous interview of Hitler by New 
York Post and the Philadelphia Ledger foreign correspondent Dorothy Thompson, which was 
published in Cosmospolitan in March 1932.
76
 Peter Carlson argues that Thompson described 
Hitler as “much-hyped demagogue [who] was too peculiar to be a threat to Germany, much less 
to the United States.”77 He suggests that Thompson was not “prepared for the man she met, who 
seemed so.. pathetic.”78 Thompson’s interview with Hitler was done around the same time as 
Schultz’s, but was published on a later date. It can be said that Thompson grossly underestimated 
Hitler, because he took control of Germany within a year of the interview. She spent much of the 
next decade attempting to fix her reporting mistake by writing critical articles about Hitler and 
the Nazi Party, which eventually got her the honor of being the first journalists expelled from 
Germany in 1934.
79
 Evidently, Schultz, who had helped Thompson to get the interview with 
Hitler, had a different understanding of Germany’s political situation from 1930 to 1932.80 Both 
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women were journalists, but Schultz has the experience in Germany to write a warning about 
Hitler’s political power.    
Their different conclusions emphasize the original question of how Schultz was able to 
report from Germany with the emerging governmental press rules. The fact Schultz even 
received a rare interview with Hitler is a testament to her abilities as a reporter. A couple of days 
after Schultz’s interview with him was published on December 5, a New York Times article 
stated that “Hitler barely escaped expulsion from Germany today when he attempted to stage 
another interview with foreign correspondent as a retort to Chancellor Brüning’s radio 
castigation.”81 This article does not provide any indication of how Hitler would be expelled or 
the identity of the correspondent. It may have been Schultz’s interview that triggered Hitler’s 
drive and the German government’s reaction, but it does suggest that the government was 
attempting to curb Hitler’s influence on the media and his ability to political attack the current 
government. The threats of expulsion also showed to what length the government was willing to 
protect the peace and their rule in Germany.  
This New York Times article suggested that Sigrid Schultz and the rest of the foreign 
correspondents in Germany experienced little or no harassment from the German government for 
their reporting until the end of 1931. It was more of a question on how the foreign correspondent 
evaluated the political situation in Germany. Clearly, Schultz and Thompson initially had two 
different views over Hitler. Most likely, Schultz was able to get the interview, because of her 
connections in Germany and her negative tone matched the German government’s press goals 
with Hitler. The issue for Schultz at this early stage was that most of her articles about 
Germany’s political situation were not seen as front-page material by editors in Chicago. One 
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cannot definitively determine why they did not appear on the front page expect for the fact other 
news was seen as more important at the time.
82
 
The New York Times reporters in Germany faced a similar situation with their editors, 
however, on average more stories about Germany’s general situation appeared on the front 
page.
83
 This newspaper had more reporters located in Germany at the start of 1930, but most of 
them did not receive a byline for their articles.
84
 The main reporter for the New York Times in 
Germany with a byline was Guido Enderis, who became chief of the Berlin News Bureau in 
1930. The Times had hired Enderis in 1928, because they thought he would be culturally 
adaptable to Germany. He was Swiss-born and, more importantly, had experience reporting from 
in Germany during World War I. Laurel Leff argued that the issue with Enderis’s reporting was 
his extreme German sympathies, which became apparent to his editors by 1935.
85
 Leff’s 
argument is lacking an analysis of his reporting from 1930 to 1933 before Nazis took control of 
Germany. Enderis’s sympathy for Germany does not come through in his reporting from 1930 to 
1931. His reporting is comparable to Sigrid Schultz’s reporting with only some writing style 
differences in how he critically described the events unfolding in Germany. 
Enderis’s reporting on the election results for Germany in September of 1930 is an 
illustrative case in point. In one article on September 15, he discussed how the election was a 
surprise for everyone, but he devoted very little space to what the election results meant for 
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Hitler and his party. Rather, he focused on providing an overview of the political parties 
involved in the election. The only issue he discussed at length was how the fascists and 
communists could join together as a group in order to block any unfavorable laws from passing. 
There were also about three short paragraphs that were devoted to Hitler’s message and support 
base, but little in way of an analysis. A small glimpse of it was in Enderis’s description of how 
Hitler attracted his followers. He wrote, “Herr Hitler also kindled the imagination of millions of 
young voters by the fiery nature of his oratory, while the more mature electorate was fed with 
anti-Semitic, anti-reparations and anti-parliamentary haranguing.”86 The subtitle for this article 
provided some indication of the fascists’ goals and what Enderis thought about them, which was 
“Fascists Oppose the Young Plan- Stand for Extreme Nationalism and Curb on Foreigners.”87 
His article provided a brief assessment of Hitler’s intentions and some facts on his rise to power 
in the German government. Many of his other articles followed a similar pattern with a couple of 
exceptions.
88
    
One of the rare articles that Enderis wrote exclusively on Hitler and the Nazi party was 
published on the New York Times’s front page on September 26, 1930.89 This article was 
published shortly after Reichstag election of September 14, 1930, which was when the Nazi 
Party received 6.4 million votes and seated 107 deputies as the second largest party.
90
 Enderis’s 
front-page article gave a good indication of Hitler’s political ideas. It was entitled “Hitler Would 
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Scrap Versailles Treaty and Use Guillotine,” which was most likely intended to capture the 
readers’ attention, because the word guillotine is often associated with mass murder and political 
revolution.
 91
 Enderis’ description on Hitler’s testimony during his trial for treason against the 
German government in 1924 gave the reader a base in his political ideology. Enderis quoted 
Hitler as saying, “We National Socialists refuse to recognize the treaties concluded over the 
heads of the German people as of permanent duration and also propose to fight the war guilt 
lie.”92 This description clearly described Hitler’s early political ideology in plain language, and 
pointed about his hindsight for Germany 
His other articles about Hitler and the Nazi party focused on the many feuds with the 
other German political parties, and the political violence that followed.
93
 In an article published 
on October 15, 1930, Enderis described an interesting situation when Hitler was being accused of 
inciting riots in Berlin that damaged the business district.
94
 This article was written a couple of 
days after the Reichstag meet for the first time since the election in September of 1930. The 
Nazis incited political chaos throughout Berlin by wearing their brown shirts in parliament and 
defying the law. Joseph Goebbels also organized the first attacks on Jewish businesses, while 
other Nazi supporters fought with communists in the streets.
95
 
In the October article, Enderis quoted Hitler as denying any connection to these riots by 
challenging how the police handled the rioters and suggested that communists were provoking 
them in order to discredit the Nazi party. Enderis described this further by saying, “To him 
[Hitler] the two extreme radical parties, the National Socialists and the Communists, constitute 
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symbols of the coming development, a Bolshevistic or a Nationalist Germany.”96 This article 
described the political unrest in Germany, especially between the Nazis and Communists, and 
did not point towards a bright future. Enderis’s articles showed very little favoritism towards 
Hitler and his role in Germany’s political difficulties. If Enderis had been pro-Nazi, he would 
have described a more positive future for Germany with the Nazi Party.
97
  
Most likely, Enderis was also actively trying to get more information about Hitler; 
however, the German government was attempting to curb Hitler’s potential power by denying 
him a public platform to spread his ideas in Germany. On December 11, 1931, Enderis described 
how Hitler was denied the chance to give an interview to a foreign correspondent by the German 
government.
98
 The German government was also becoming worried about how the press could 
undermine its economic reform plans from 1931 to 1932.
99
 Enderis’s reporting may have also 
been influenced by the New York Times’s clamp down on stories about anti-Semitism, in general, 
as Hitler rose in power. Leff argues that the Times banned the use of any letters to the editor 
about Hitler’s rise in power, because the owner did not want his newspaper to become a running 
commentary of the Jews’ situation in Germany. This would make the newspaper appear to focus 
only on the Jewish issue, because the owner was also Jewish.
100
  
Nevertheless, the other New York Times journalists without a byline in Germany did not 
seem to pay much attention to the policy or the German government. They almost reported 
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entirely on Hitler and his rise in political power from 1930 to 1932.
101
 These articles were more 
detailed and explicit about discussing Hitler’s intent for Germany’s future. An article published 
on September 30, 1930 provided their readers with a complete discussion on Hitler’s political, 
economic, and social goals for Germany. For example, it stated one of Hitler’s goals was “a 
nation-wide campaign to disfranchise or drive from Germany all the Jews.”102 It also goes on to 
describe how “all journalists must be German citizens, and all productions of art and literature 
contrary to the principles of true Germanism are to be suppressed.”103 This statement 
foreshadowed the Nazis’ attitude towards journalists after they gained full control over the 
government between 1933 and 1934.  
Unfortunately, most of these articles were placed in the back of the newspaper. These 
reporters, including Enderis, had only about 49 front page articles and 104 editorials about Hitler 
and the Nazi party from 1930 to 1931.
104
 The lack of front page news articles cannot be 
explained by a lack of articles from foreign correspondents or what was published in The Times. 
It also cannot be clarified based on the archival sources, because the lack of communication 
among editors and correspondents. Like the Chicago Tribune, it can only indicate that Hitler and 
the Nazi party were not on the newspaper’s front page for lack of importance instead of a lack of 
reporting.  
The lack of front page articles does not change for the New York Times’s or Chicago 
Tribune reporters until late 1931. This can be contributed to Hitler gaining more political power 
in Germany from the political unrest, which caused the Western governments to be concerned. 
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Hitler also acquired a full time foreign press chief, Ernst “Putzi” Hanfstaengl, in early 1932 to 
communicate with foreign press.
105
 Therefore, the correspondents had more access to 
information channels and their articles became more relevant news for the West.
106
 In 1932, 
Hitler’s and the Nazi Party’s media image across the world became an important factor for their 
rise to power, which meant they needed to project a strong and stable persona for the other 
Western countries. This meant that the correspondents’ press freedom in Germany also began to 
change after 1931. 
 The Reichstag was slowly descending into political violence and chaos by the end of 
1931, because of political tensions caused by the polarized electorate. This situation became 
even more precarious in 1932, because Germany had a presidential election with Paul von 
Hindenburg approaching his final year of his seven-year term. Most Western nations were 
watching to see who would emerge from not only the violence, but also the campaign. At the age 
of 84, Hindenburg decided to run, yet again, in order to stop Hitler from gaining more 
momentum and posing a threat to the standing government. This developed into run off for votes 
between Hitler, Hindenburg, and Ernst Thälmann of the Communist Party. Hitler was not able to 
unseat Hindenburg from the presidency; however, he continued to gain strength and political 
influence with him earning 37 percent of the vote.
107
 The foreign correspondents were in the 
midst of this political battle that heavily influenced the direction of Germany’s future, but were 
they able to publish detailed stories about the tension among political parties as their freedom of 
the press slowly disappeared? 
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Sigrid Schultz was one of the first foreign correspondents in Germany to mention any 
sort of difficulties with her reporting after the presidential and Reichstag elections in early 
1932.
108
 She was the journalist that used her political connections to get an interview with Hitler 
before 1931 and showed a negative attitude towards the Nazi Party.
109
 On November 23, 1932, 
Schultz mentioned in a letter to Colonel McCormick how the German Foreign Office was 
pressuring her to “color news” in favor of Herr von Papen.110 In May of 1932, Hindenburg 
appointed his aristocrat friend, Papen, as the new Reich Chancellor and successor to Brüning, 
because he thought Brüning’s government was too unpopular. Papen was known for his 
conservative values and his anti-democratic policies. Papen attempted to align himself with the 
Nazis in order to gather mass support for his agenda, and decided to influence Hitler with a 
political concession of dissolving Reichstag in July for another election in order to gain his 
support.
111
  
On July of 1932, the SA caused a mass riot in Altona near Hamburg in order to influence 
the election. Papen used these riots as an excuse to disband the Prussian state government, 
because he claimed that it could not handle the violence. This dealt a crushing blow to Weimar 
Republic as a democracy, because the German government became more centralized. This did 
not quell the political chaos in the Reichstag, which led to Papen requesting it to be dissolved 
and new elections scheduled for November 6. Many of the political parties including the Nazis 
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were upset about having to pay for yet another election.
112
 Schultz’s letter to McCormick was 
written a couple of weeks after this Reichstag election, which was when Papen was the most 
unpopular.
113
 Schultz was most likely pressured by the German government, because Papen 
needed a good media image in order to help keep control of Germany. This was one of the signs 
that the German government attempted to centralize its control over the domestic and foreign 
press for its own needs and purposes.  
Richard Evans argues that Papen attempted to shape the German press’s account of these 
riots by banning democratic newspapers. This would have helped him to gather more support in 
Germany. Evans did not mention anything about foreign newspapers and their correspondents’ 
reporting of these events.
114
 Schultz’s letter suggests that the German government did not want 
these riots discussed in the American press unless it was written in a positive light, justifying 
Papen’s actions. However, Schultz did not pay much attention to the German government’s 
wishes in her articles and showed how the government had little control over the foreign press in 
1932. 
Schultz wrote a couple of articles immediately after Reichstag election in November that 
showed her negative opinion of Papen’s leadership. On November 6, 1932, Schultz published an 
article that described how “Germany found itself engaged in a bitter four cornered political fight 
for seats in the [R]eichstag.”115 She identified the four as Republicans, Chancellor von Papen, 
Adolf Hitler, and the Communists. She discussed how “Von Papen is preaching respect for law, 
yet his high handed dealings with the Prussian government and his violation of the rulings of the 
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Supreme Court have resulted in a conflict with strong forces in Prussia and Bavaria.”116 In her 
article on November 13, 1932, Schultz argued that Von Papen’s governing style was equal to a 
dictatorship. She even described that Von Papen was losing the support of Hitler and the Nazi 
party, because his actions were seen as dictatorship to most of Germany.
117
 Clearly, Schultz had 
a negative attitude towards Papen’s leadership and lacked respect for his agenda. Papen’s 
pressure evidently did not influence her into writing any positive news stories about his 
leadership in Germany. 
Both of Schultz’s articles were describing the problems of Papen’s government, which 
hurt his and Germany’s image on the international stage. More importantly, it suggests that the 
German government had attempted to influence foreign correspondents even before Hitler rose 
to power, but had little to no success. This governmental pressure can be dated back to at least to 
the end of 1931 as previous discussed with limited press access to Hitler.
118
 Schultz also 
mentioned in her letter on November 23, 1932 that the German Foreign Office had a department 
that took care of the foreign press and summoned them for significant infractions against the 
German government in their reporting. Most likely, this department had very little power in 
1932, because Schultz was able to fend them off by stating that the ministry “was losing his time 
threatening me with expulsion, since my expulsion would make a dramatic story and leave no 
doubt in anybody’s mind that Germany was run by Junker government.”119 However, this does 
not mean that other American foreign correspondents had such an easy experience with the 
German government or even reacted in the same manner as Sigrid Schultz.  
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The New York Times reacted to the political chaos in Germany by hiring a British 
journalist, Fredrick Birchall, as chief Foreign Correspondent of Europe in 1932. Birchall traveled 
around all of Europe, but focused on reporting events from Germany. At the time of his 
employment, he was already in his sixties and had worked as an editor for The New York Times 
in London from 1926 to 1931. He was known for his dedication to his employer and work, 
because he would sleep in the office so he would not miss a phoned in story. In 1934, Birchall 
was awarded a Pulitzer prize for his observant coverage on the Nazi regime. His excellent 
reporting was often credited to his understanding of the New York Times’s fragile position in 
Germany from it being owned by a Jewish family.
 The German Jewish community’s situation 
was progressively becoming worse and the American Jewish community expected the Times to 
publicize or be accused of white washing the situation in Germany.
120
  Therefore, the Times 
needed a journalist that could report the news about the Jewish situation in Germany without 
making it appear as the sole focus of the paper and protect its reputation. 
Birchall’s reporting in 1932 showed that he had an ability to balance promoting 
awareness of events in Germany without glossing over important facts, but it does not always 
come through in each of his articles. This can be seen in his description of Germany’s 
presidential and general Reichstag elections throughout 1932. One of his first articles published 
on March 13, 1932 was titled, “Republic is in Balance,” with subtitles of “Opponents of 
Hindenburg Seek to Overthrow Democratic Rule, All of Europe is Worried, Future Courses of 
Half Its Nations Will be Affected by the Outcome.”121 His title fostered awareness that not only 
Germany had a stake in the upcoming presidential election, but also Europe and the United 
States. Birchall was intent not only to catch all of Europe’s eyes, but also in the United States, 
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when, he wrote, “the result will affect the future course of half the countries of Europe, and its 
repercussion cannot but reach distant America.”122 In the rest of his article, Birchall explained 
how this election would influence the Germany’s political landscape. One of his foci was to 
explain why the working class was discontent with the current government.
123
 This article was 
intended to showcase the importance of the potential, political chaos brewing in Germany. 
However, most of his other articles in 1932 did not follow this pattern of a detailed political and 
opinionated discussion.  
Most of his other articles in 1932 did not take on such a crusade, but Birchall did not 
provide an explanation for any change in his reporting. It could have been that Birchall did not 
think the situation called for it anymore, because after the first presidential election in early 
March of 1932 no party had a majority in the Reichstag and Hindenburg barely edged out Hitler 
for the presidency in the run-off election a month later.
124
 Birchall may have thought Hitler was 
only a minimal threat at this point, because the presidency was secure. Therefore, it makes sense 
that most of his other articles focused on providing information about the political fallout, party 
violence, and Germany’s future instead of warning about Hitler.125 
As a case in point, Birchall’s article on March 20, 1932 described the Nazi Party as still 
having a strong support base, but politically plateauing in its power for the next couple of years. 
He described Germany’s political situation as a “season for considering the danger from which 
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she has temporarily escaped and the extent to which it will last during the next few years.”126 
This showed that Birchall clearly thought the recent president election indicated Hitler was 
unable to gain enough public support to be dangerous. Essentially, Birchall saw Hitler’s loss and 
the future run-off election as a sign of the Nazis losing public support. He described the Nazis as 
“it is probably wrong to call it a “party”; it is just a well-organized[,] semi-hysterical assembly of 
the discontented- has come out of this election with a depleted exchequer but with enthusiasm 
and hopes of its devotees almost undimmed.”127 Birchall did not ignore the fact that the Nazi 
Party was strong, because he clearly stated that Hitler posed a threat before the presidential 
election in March of 1932. He presented the idea that the Nazis were not yet able to grain any 
significant political strength in the German government by the lack of support and votes in the 
presidential election.  
Nevertheless, Birchall was not the only reporter in the New York Times’s Berlin News 
bureau. The news chief, Guido Enderis, still reported heavily on events in Germany, and the gist 
of his articles largely remained unchanged from 1930 to 1931. For example, his article published 
on February of 1932 described Hindenburg’s announcement of his campaign for presidency as 
clearly drawing the political lines in Germany. He stated that “Hindenburg has brought confusion 
to the reactionary and Fascist forces, and competent political observers predict he will be re-
elected.”128 This quote indicated that the President was the candidate for the Weimar Republic, 
because of his fighting for a system that only caused problems for Germany.
129
 Therefore, 
Enderis’ reporting was providing a sense of what was happening in Germany by describing the 
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deep political divides emerging in Germany. More importantly, this article appeared on the front 
page of the New York Times and it was not a unique case.  
The New York Times did not only hire Birchall in 1932 to cover the events in Germany. 
The bylines of several other correspondents appeared in the newspaper who reported from Berlin 
and had no connection to other news services appeared in the Times.
130
 Even though, they were 
not used often in the newspaper, however, it showed that the Times started to expand its coverage 
on Berlin and Germany. In fact, the New York Times had nearly double the number of front page 
articles from 1930 and 1931, which included new perspectives from the other journalists.
131
 The 
reason for changes cannot be fully contributed to one factor; however, it showed that Times 
recognized that Germany was becoming important enough to world events.  
 Both of the newspapers paid attention to the political tensions developing in Germany at 
the start of 1932. The only differences between the news coverage was how the correspondents 
reacted to the events, which can be attributed to their journalistic abilities and opinion. It is also 
important to note that 1932 was the time when foreign correspondents started to experience press 
regulation and censorship by the German government. Both Schultz and Enderis alluded to new 
rules in either their personal letters or articles. Schultz even mentioned that an entire department 
existed within the Foreign Office in order to watch over the foreign press in her letter to Robert 
McCormick on November 1932.
132
 The Nazis were not the ones that instituted such rules. Rather 
Germany was slowly descending into authoritarian rule even before 1933. This is not to say that 
the foreign correspondents’ situation did not worsen under the Nazis’ rule in Germany. In fact, 
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the correspondents found themselves in a completely different situation by the time Nazis fully 
consolidated their power in 1934. By then, their journalistic freedoms had deteriorated and it had 
happened quickly. 
The foreign correspondents in Germany did not immediately lose all of their rights as 
journalists when Hitler became chancellor in early 1933, because the Nazis did not have full 
control over the government. Over the next two years, the Nazis would increase the levels of 
political violence and intimidation in order to crush their political rivals’ power. The most 
pointed example was how the Nazis used the Reichstag fire on February 27, 1933 to attack and 
demolish the Communists’ and Social Democrats’ power by blaming them for it. This fire 
allowed the Nazis to push through a questionable proposal written the day before that would 
limit civil liberties and stop future political protest. Therefore, the Nazis’ mass arrests of 
communists were legally sound.
133
 This meant that the civil liberties and freedoms in Germany 
also disappeared for much of the German public, which changed the situation for foreign 
correspondents rather quickly from 1933 to 1934.  
The correspondents experienced somewhat of a “transitional period,” while the Nazis 
attempted to consolidate their power in the German government from 1933 to 1934. The Nazi 
press regulations largely remained hands off or indirect, which can be contributed to them 
wanting to avoid an international issue. In fact, the Nazis at first continued much of the same 
censorship and press regulations towards foreign correspondent as the Weimar Republic, but 
with a stricter resolve and force. Most of the correspondents’ troubles revolved around trying to 
find a safe communication route to send their articles out of Germany. They also had to figure 
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out how to sort through the information provided to them by official governmental sources, such 
as the Propaganda Ministry, the Foreign Office, or the Nazi Party Press Chief.
134
 More 
importantly, they had to be weary of what news was being reported about the German 
government and the Nazi party in their respective newspapers, because it could incur negative 
repercussions from the German government. The correspondents had to decide in these years if 
they were willing to risk their journalistic careers and, in some cases even their life, in order to 
report accurate news from Germany.  
Sigrid Schultz was one of the foreign correspondents who was willing to take a risk with 
her career in order to send her uncensored articles back home. It took courage and ingenuity to 
get around the Nazi press system. She never fully explained her drive and reasoning to report all 
of the news from Germany. Most likely, part of it can be attributed to her upbringing in Europe 
and experience in Germany during the first war, but nothing can be said for certain expect for 
one fact: Sigrid Schultz remained in Germany after 1933 and reported heavily on the Nazi 
government without showing much signs of censorship or wavering from her anti-Nazis stance.  
At the start of 1933, Sigrid Schultz alluded to more censorship issues in her letters back 
home. A Chicago Tribune cable editor, George J. Scharschug, told Schultz in a letter on March 
27, 1933 not to worry about the censorship, because she was doing “an excellent job on the 
German situation.”135 Schultz most likely sent him a letter or cable earlier in the month that 
discussed the troubles she was having with Nazi censorship and how it affected her reporting. 
Her message was written at the time when the Nazis started to consolidate their power in 
Germany. This might explain why Schultz had difficulties and worries with the Nazi censoring 
her articles, because civil liberties were basically being demolished in Germany. Most likely, the 
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German government was progressively limiting the press’s freedom, because Schultz was not the 
only Chicago Tribune reporter to complain about German censorship.  
Edmond Taylor, who was normally reporting from France, traveled around Germany for 
several of days in 1933 to provide some more mailer stories on the current revolution in Saar.
136
 
Taylor wrote in a letter to Colonel McCormick on April 25, 1933 about how he could not get a 
detailed report on events past the German censors; however, Taylor did not describe how the 
Germans would censor his material.
137
 Taylor only came to Germany for news stories 
occasionally and, thus, did not have to worry about German censors completely ruining his 
career; however, in subsequent years, the French government would institute press regulations as 
well.
138
 Sigrid Schultz’s career and reporting, on the other hand, depended heavily on finding a 
way around the German system.  
Sigrid Schultz sent several letters and cables to Colonel McCormick and Mr. Scharschug 
that discussed how she worked in the Nazi press system. Most of these letters were dated from 
late December of 1933 and throughout 1934. This does not mean she made no attempt of 
working around the Nazi censorship prior to these letters. These documents are simply the 
earliest ones that mention how she changed her reporting in reaction to the Nazis’ policies. 
Essentially, these letters allude to a structure that Schultz set up within Germany and its 
neighboring countries in order to send articles back home with the least amount of censorship 
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and problems. This system changed throughout 1933 and 1934, because the Nazis tightened their 
control over the foreign press’s freedom. 
The first time she mentioned how she worked within the Nazi new press system was in 
her letter to McCormick on December 1, 1933. Her main focus in this letter was to describe the 
current state of journalism and politics in Germany through several different events. In the letter, 
she noted, “I just discovered a friend who will be leaving Germany in a few hours and I seize this 
opportunity to rush off a few uncensored notes to you!”139 She might even be referencing this 
very letter. She does not describe who the friend was or what was on the pages, but it showed 
that the Nazis were not taking material from people who were leaving Germany. She goes on to 
describe how German reporters would not risk talking to a foreigner let alone a foreign 
correspondent, because of the regime change. She also described how the previous German 
generation of newspapermen were forced out. She stated that, “[i]t is ridiculous to speak of the 
men running German newspapers nowadays as newspapermen. They are low ranking state 
officials.” She even goes as far to describe them “file-clerks.”140 Therefore, local news sources 
could not even be considered as news, but the official German government’s point of view. The 
important question to ask did the foreign correspondents have the same reporting problem. 
Schultz’s letter and articles do not confirm that any of her rights had been compromised, but it 
does show how the German government influenced her ability to report in an indirect way by 
limiting the available information.  
This letter from December of 1933 also mentioned an incident about documents from the 
German Propaganda Ministry being published by Le Petit Parisien, a local French paper. The 
documents were two secret directives by Joseph Goebbels on how to shape the news about 
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France in a negative fashion.
141
 The incident itself is not important, but how the German 
government treated the revelation is relevant. Schultz described in the letter how the German 
newspapermen were commanded to pump foreign correspondents on any information about the 
event and then had to give up the names of foreign correspondents who talked too much about 
the details relating to Petit Parisien.
142
 Schultz did not clearly describe what happened to those 
correspondents or how the German reporters reacted to the command, but it showed how the 
Nazis attempted to watch the foreign correspondents without directly interacting with them. 
 Sigrid Schultz’s reporting, however, showed no signs of slowing down from any 
censorship or sources issues. In an article, shortly after the Reichstag fire in February 1933, 
Schultz provided a detailed assessment of exactly what the presidential decree, Protection of 
People and State, did for the general German population’s civil liberties. The decree virtually 
eliminated the civil liberties in Germany and extended the state of emergency.
143
 She stated that, 
“The decree virtually puts Germany under martial law with extraordinary powers placed in the 
hands of the police.”144 By using the words “martial law,” Schultz was painting a picture of how 
the German government handled the social and political situation in Germany.  
She enforced her opinion of the government by calling the decree a “reprisal” instead of a 
plan. Later on, Schultz used a quote by an unnamed spokesman, “In a few months the world will 
realize the great service Chancellor Hitler is rendering by stamping out communism. The 
parliamentary democratic regime is not coming back.”145 This speaker was intent on supporting 
the Nazi regime; however, Schultz inclusion of it drove home the idea that Germany was not a 
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democracy anymore. This was reinforced by her description of how civil liberties were restricted 
for the Communists. Schultz could not have written it any clearer in this article, unless she 
spelled out that Hitler was a dictator and Germany was in trouble. Clearly, the editors of the 
Tribune supported her assessment, because this article appeared on the front page of the 
newspaper. More importantly, it also showed how confident Schultz was that she would not face 
any negative repercussions from the German government at this time.  
In another article on April 8, 1933, Schultz continued to describe how Hitler took 
complete control over Germany and created a dictatorship. She stated, “While absolute control 
by Hitler and his allies over Germany is being enforced politically [,] a similar realignment is 
being effected in all walks of life with an enthusiasm and thoroughness that is breathtaking.”146 
She made an argument that no one was safe from the Hitler’s political overhaul, which 
effectively made Germany a centralized state. This article failed to mention how the Jews were 
being phased out of the civil service at this time. She explained how, “the ministry of labor is 
drafting measures to eliminate Jewish physicians from insurance jobs and as medical 
examiners.”147 Her use of “eliminate” does not leave any hope of them returning to their jobs. 
Most of Schultz’s articles in 1933 were openly discussing Germany’s social and political issues 
without positively slating them toward the Nazi government.
148
 Clearly, she found a way around 
German press regulation to send these articles with minimum amount of intervention in 1933.  
By the start of 1934, Schultz had more issues with reporting since she set up separate 
communication routes in Holland and Czechoslovakia in order to avoid German censors. She 
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first discussed these routes in a letter to Colonel McCormick on January 7, 1934. This letter 
discussed how she was happy to be also assigned to report on Holland and Czechoslovakia, 
because it gave her a chance to avoid the German censors and take in news from the outside 
world.
149
 This letter signaled the fact that correspondents had to leave Germany in order to 
perform their duties as correspondents and to receive the basic news from the world. It also 
showed that one of the most secure ways to get articles or papers out of Germany was to physical 
walk them across the border.   
In a letter from March of 1934, Schultz also described how she was able to make a deal 
with Prager Presse in Prague for them to send her articles in exchange for copies of their news 
messages from London.
150
 This system of news exchange opened up another communication 
route for Schultz. It cannot be definitely said that other correspondents in Germany used the 
same communication routes, but the location made the most sense for anyone trying to avoid the 
prying eyes of the German censors. Prague is relatively close to Germany’s borders and 
remained a strong democracy in 1934. Other cities like Paris would require a lengthy train ride, 
which would cost the newspaper a lot of money and time.  
A couple of months later, there was a change in the tone of Schultz’s letters to the 
Chicago Tribune. Her letter to Mr. Scharschug, the cable editor, on Aug 13, 1934 discussed how 
she was leaving Germany for a couple of days to “send out some treacherous mail or 
treasonable.”151 She also gave explicit directions not to have any of these articles to be published 
under her name, but did not provide any more information about her reasoning. Most journalists 
strive for their bylines and for space on the front page, because it gave them recognition for their 
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careers. If a story is missing its byline, it is almost impossible for anyone to track down the 
author. The only way would be to find the editor who placed the story for that edition; however, 
this was most likely the intent of Schultz. The Nazis would not have no legitimate way of 
connecting Schultz to her articles, which would protect her from any negative repercussions and 
allow her to continue her critical reporting.  
Schultz’s change in demeanor could also be contributed to an incident with the Chicago 
Tribune’s Paris edition. Schultz briefly mentioned in the letter to the editor, George Scharschug, 
about how the German government reacted to a critical article of hers that had been published in 
Paris. She explicitly asked the editors in Paris to soften it, because of the effect it could have on 
her position in Germany.  She wrote, “it would have gotten by if had been toned down a bit. 
Threats have been sizzling in the air ever since.”152 Schultz had to take steps in Germany to start 
protecting her identity on the more negative articles by 1934, which at times required more than 
changing her name. Case in point, Schultz discussed how the telephoning stories through Paris 
remained unsafe, because of mistakes made by the colleagues in Paris. She wrote one of her 
articles contained “[c]omradly assassination” instead of “cowardly assassination.”153 These terms 
did not necessarily cause issues for this particular story, but Schultz pointed out that it could ruin 
her position in Germany in the future. Ultimately, Schultz’s complaints about the telephone 
operators in Paris and issues over the attribution of articles to her showed how one infraction 
against the Germany government could cause a foreign correspondent to lose her position or, 
even worse, to be arrested.  
 Sigrid Schultz was not the only correspondent who had to learn how to operate in this 
precarious position in Germany. The New York Times journalists had to interact with German 
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government very carefully, because the owner of the paper was Jewish. The Jewish heritage of 
the New York Times owner played a progressively larger factor in their correspondents’ position 
in Germany, because the German government already had negative opinion of the Jewish owned 
newspaper. Therefore, any New York Times correspondent had to be aware of how his reporting 
would affect the newspaper’s fragile relationship with the German government.154 The 
correspondents were clearly conscious of their situation, because Frederick Birchall wrote to Mr. 
Sulzberger on March 21, 1933 about how Times was pretty much doomed in Germany.
155
 
Laurel Leff states that the New York Times Berlin News Bureau protected this fragile 
relationship with Germany and its reputation by hiring Otto Tolischus. Leff argues that Tolischus 
and Birchall’s investigative reporting would balance Enderis’s sympathies for Germany; 
however, she ignored Enderis’s previous experience with the German government during World 
War I.
156
 In fact, The New York Times editor Edwin L. James described in a memorandum from 
1940 how Enderis had remained in Germany for the last 30 years with short breaks for vacation 
and had some experience working under wartime conditions. It is unclear what exactly Enderis 
did immediately after the Nazis consolidated power in 1933 in order to help the Times remain 
open. The memorandum from 1940 was one of the first times Enderis’s role was acknowledged 
in keeping the bureau open after 1933. James described that Enderis had become more of a 
negotiator with the government.
157
 The aspects of this relationship do not come to light until the 
New York Times correspondents got into trouble with the government after 1934; however, this 
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does not mean that Enderis did not play the negotiation role during the Nazis’ rise and 
consolidation of power, as well.  
Leff’s characterization of The Times’s Berlin News Bureau does have some merit and 
logic. It would have been a logical choice for the New York Times to hire Tolischus in reaction to 
the Nazis’ rise in power. Based on the date of the memorandum, The Times most likely was 
completely unaware of Enderis’s emerging role as negotiator. Tolischus also had a solid cultural 
background in Germany, because of his family connections and since he had lived there until he 
was 17 years old, when he immigrated with his parents to the United States. He graduated from 
Columbia School of Journalism by 1916, and afterwards served in the United States Army 
during World War I. He remained in Europe as a freelance journalist throughout the 1920s until 
he was hired by the Times in 1933 to work in Berlin.
158
  
Much of Tolischus’s reporting in 1933 and 1934 is comparable to that of Schultz, 
because of its detailed and critical attitude towards the Nazis. On July 15, 1933, he reported how 
Hitler was seizing all of his enemies’ property in order to solidify his power over Germany. He 
showed his opinion of Hitler’s actions by comparing him to the communists. Most likely, 
Tolischus purposely did this to insult the Nazi party, because at the time they were having mass 
arrest of communists in reaction to the Reichstag Fire.  He also does not whitewash any of the 
effects on the people in Germany, “the government also undertook to silence all German critics 
in foreign lands by applying the policy of seizing their relatives.”159 This article is clearly 
showing how the Nazi regime took away the civil liberties of people and lumping them together 
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with their political enemy, the communists. His reporting does not veer away from this type of 
critical nature.
160
  
In another article on November 5, 1933, Tolischus discussed the trial of the people who 
set the Reichstag on fire, which was essentially the trial of Dimtroff. He was the alleged 
mastermind beyond the Reichstag fire in early 1933.
161
 Tolischus titled it, “Goering and A Red 
Exchange Taunts in Reich Fire Case,” with a subtitle of “Battle of Invective Terminates.”162 He 
did not outright discuss his opinion of the court case, however, an idea of it comes through 
simply by his titles. His use of red in the title directly relates to the Nazis and Communists yet 
again. Tolischus also belittles the entire event by saying everyone involved was a termite.  Like 
Schultz, his critical reporting does not let up on the Nazis’ actions from 1933 to 1934.  
These articles or News Bureau’s hearsay cannot provide any decisive indication of how 
and why the New York Times decided to react towards the Nazis rise in power at the start of 
1933. It cannot be argued that the New York Times remained open after 1933. From 1933 to 
1934, all of the reporters had equal representation of their work on the front page. This does not 
necessarily mean that all reporters were seen has equals by The Times. It does show however that 
The Times had not made a clear choice to silent or completely ignore one of the reporters. More 
importantly, the combination of reporters assigned to the Berlin News Bureau kept the Times 
from shutting down in 1933.  
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 The foreign correspondents experienced different levels of press regulation from the 
German government between 1930 and 1934. Initially, the foreign press was able to report 
almost anything about events in Germany. They did not face the same regulations as the German 
press, which already had part of their freedom curtailed at the start of 1930. Foreign 
correspondents began to have issues with reporting in 1931, which was the same time that Hitler 
gained in political strength. The standing German government attempted to curb Hitler’s 
popularity through the press, which included curtailing foreign and domestic press. This is an 
important case study of how a government’s well intentioned idea to start centralizing its control 
can set a bad precedent for later governments.  
The foreign correspondents’ situation did not change again until Hitler and the Nazi Party 
began to consolidate their power after 1933. At first, the German government restricted the 
foreign press in an indirect way by limiting the available information. This method was intended 
to avoid any international incidents due to the treatment of a foreign correspondent. This brief 
period of hand-off regulation did not last long with the German government, because of the 
Nazis’ concerns over their media image. Over the course of a year, this progressed into a 
complicated German press system focused on keeping track of foreign correspondents’ articles 
about the German government.  
The foreign correspondents who survived in the German press system were the ones who 
recognized how their situation was changing day by day. Sigrid Schultz had a deep 
understanding of how European and, especially, German culture operated, which gave her the 
necessary tools to sense the political changes. Schultz’s articles were constantly drawing out the 
German social and political issues from 1930 to 1934. More importantly, she also reacted to the 
events by starting to develop new methods of reporting. This is not to say that the other 
56 
correspondents assigned to in Germany were unable to write on the unfolding political chaos. 
The New York Times journalists produced similar articles to that of Sigrid Schultz. 
Unfortunately, the foreign correspondents’ situation only gets progressively worse from the end 
of 1934 as Europe’s overall political situation becomes more tense.   
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CHAPTER III 
 THE NAZIS’ TIGHTENING CONTROL OVER JOURNALISTS’ TYPEWRITERS FROM 
1934 TO 1939 
 “I am proclaiming most loudly that I know nothing of the story because I believe we are on the 
eve of very interesting developments of vital importance for the future of Europe. I would prefer 
not to make it too easy for Nazi friends to oust the Tribune Correspondent…” 163 
-Sigrid Schultz (Chicago Tribune Correspondent) on October 3
rd
, 1936 
 
At the start of 1934, foreign correspondents in Germany found themselves in a situation 
where their reporting and safety were directly connected. Sigrid Schultz wrote a report that 
described how a Czechoslovakian correspondent, Ludwig Popper, was arrested secretly by the 
Stormtroopers (SA) and taken to their prison, “Columbia House,” describing this place as “one 
of the best known beating up quarters in town.” 164 According to her, he seemed to be fine, but he 
pushed for the Foreign Press Club to gain a promise from the German government that no 
correspondent be imprisoned at the Columbia House. Schultz stated that the club could not even 
set up a meeting with Reich Marshal Hermann Goering. Later on in the report, she wrote, 
however, “if one is a little careful, I’m sure there is no need to be nervous.”165 Schultz had 
confidence in the security of her position in Germany, but most correspondents did not. The 
possibility of being arrested, expelled from Germany or, even worse, sent to Columbia House 
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would have caused concern. This left the correspondents with the choice of appeasing the Nazis 
by publishing positive stories about them or taking a risk with critical reporting. 
Foreign correspondents were not the only ones who had to face this question about the 
Nazi party. Western nations had to evaluate the Nazi party and decide how to work with them by 
1934, because the Nazis had consolidated its power in Germany. The Nazis had the political 
power to transform Germany’s political structure from a multi-party state into a one party 
system. They were able to gain power by using strategies such as inciting violence in the streets, 
secret imprisonments, and murder to stop political enemies. Richard Evans argues that Hitler 
intended to create an atmosphere of fear and chaos in the Germany, while promoting Nazis’ 
ideals with a constant stream of propaganda. This created a new German culture based only on 
Nazi values, which would then foster little opposition from the German population.
166
 
The Nazis’ known actions were seen as justifiable by the public, because the German 
press painted the Nazis’ political enemies as threats.167 This provided the Nazis with the 
legitimacy to address their political enemies with acts of violence. A well-known example is how 
Nazis used the Reichstag fire on February 27
th
, 1933 to round up and crush the communists in 
Germany. Hitler argued that it was the start of a communists’ revolution and scared most of the 
German governmental officials into passing laws similar to that of martial law.
168
 The Nazis’ last 
political restraint was lifted when President Hindenburg died in August of 1934. This allowed 
Hitler to consolidate the office of the chancellor and presidency, thus, making him the head of 
state and the most powerful German political leader.
169
 This paved the path for Hitler to test the 
boundaries of the Versailles Treaty by doing such things as introducing openly rearmament 
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programs in 1935; remilitarizing the Rhineland in 1936; the Anschluss of Austria in 1938; and 
the take-over of Czechoslovak Sudeten territories after the Munich conference in September 
1938.
170
  
In 1934, foreign correspondents across Europe became an important gateway of 
information for the American public about how the German and European political situation 
shifted because of the Nazis.
171
 Correspondents in Germany were not the sole source about 
Europe’s politics, because other European countries grew concerned about Hitler and the Nazis 
as well. These reporters’ articles were a window into whether or not Europe’s political would 
descend into another war. However, reporters outside of Germany were not always free of 
censorship and governmental influence either. The correspondents’ ability to report on the 
Europe’s situation depended completely on how their host country reacted to the political 
situation, and the individual correspondents’ capability to work with their respective 
governments.  
By 1935, other European countries became concerned about how released information to 
the media could affect their political position on the international stage and, thus, the safety of 
their country. Nevertheless, the Germans were at the forefront of limiting the press’s freedom to 
report on events after 1934. The Nazis made it difficult for any reporter to write critical articles 
about Germany by limiting the available information. There was only a brief moment of relief 
from direct German censorship in 1936, because it hosted the Olympics. Essentially, the 
Germans wanted the flood of visiting foreigners to leave with a good impression of Nazi 
Germany. Therefore, correspondents in Germany and its surrounding European countries came 
under new governmental press rules, which partially defined what information was provided to 
                                                 
170
 Fisher, Nazi Germany, 396-402, 408-409, 414-431. 
171
 Selig Alder, The Isolationists Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New York: The Free Press, 1957), 117.  
60 
the American public. However, the most defining factor was how willing a correspondent was at 
pushing the boundaries of the governments’ press rules and risking their careers and in some 
cases their lives. 
This chapter explores how the German press system and rules changed after the Nazis’ 
consolidation of power in 1934 up to 1936. The different aspects of the press situation are 
highlighted by examining Chicago Tribune Berlin correspondent, Sigrid Schultz, and then all of 
the New York Times Berlin correspondents. The next section discusses how correspondents in 
England, France, and the Soviet Union were affected by new governmental press rules. The final 
section examines how the German press rules became even tighter from 1936 to the start of the 
war.  
Reporting from Germany was seen as one of the most difficult assignments for any 
foreign correspondents in 1933. Leff argues that the German government kept a tight watch over 
any information made available to the press. This made it difficult for any reporters to find 
reliable sources and to send their news reports through the wireless.
172
 This was not a new 
situation to the correspondents in Germany, because the Weimar government started to centralize 
the state’s control over the press as a way to maintain its control.173 The Germans further 
developed these controls to impose their will on domestic and foreign press while Hitler 
consolidated his power from 1933 to 1934. Once the Nazis had control over the German 
government, the correspondents had to learn how to function in an authoritarian state which had 
little tolerance for public opposition. 
 The important question to ask is how the correspondents responded to the German press 
system after 1934. What factors would lead to correspondents taking a risk with their careers and 
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in some cases their lives to report the truth? A simple answer does not exist for these questions, 
because of the correspondents’ complex situation. The correspondents’ reports were heavily 
shaped by their ability to work in the German press system. It was fairly complicated, because of 
the multiple state and party organizations involved and changes made to the Nazi press 
leadership in 1937. The correspondents had to work in this multi-organizational, complex system 
of censorship to continue their stay in Germany. Ultimately, the reporters had to find the middle 
ground among the German news system and the requests by their respective newspapers. This 
system cannot be found in any Nazis governmental handbook, but can be gleamed from how the 
correspondents described their encounters with the government over their articles.   
In simple terms, the system was fully established after the Nazis consolidated their power 
between 1933 and 1934. One section of the press system was led by Section IV of the 
Propaganda Ministry and responsible for non-party press in Germany. Walter Funk led this 
section of the Propaganda Ministry until 1937; thereafter, the press chief of the Nazi party, Otto 
Dietrich, took over. Most likely, the foreign correspondents dealt with Wilfred Bade, because he 
was the head of the Foreign Press Section of Section IV.
174
 Unfortunately, it remains unclear 
how Funk and Bade worked with the American foreign correspondents at the start of the Nazis 
regime.  
By 1937, Bade was replaced by Karl Bömer who led the department until 1941. Historian 
Bramsted describes Bömer as well liked by the correspondents, because of his liberal press rules, 
such as talking to them about Hitler’s girlfriend Eva Braun in order to give them a “human 
interest story.” Bramsted contributes this to Bömer’s extensive travel in the United States and 
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other experiences with foreign press around the world. Essentially, Bömer understood how 
correspondents operated in foreign countries and how to develop a working relationship with 
them.
175
 
There was also a press section in the Foreign Ministry, which shared the responsibility of 
taking care of any foreign press matters with the Propaganda Ministry. This press section was the 
mirror image of the Propaganda Ministry’s section in terms of having an expert assigned to each 
country’s press. It remains unclear who headed their foreign press division, but its envoy for 
press conferences was Paul Schmidt. This most likely meant he was head of the press division in 
the Foreign Ministry under Joachim von Ribbentrop. The reporters commonly described him as 
“charming, but mostly ruthless and arrogant and in addition a poor linguist,” which made his 
press conferences were unpopular.
176
 It remains unclear from the correspondents’ writings how 
the Foreign Ministry press section interacted with the Propaganda Ministry. One can be certain 
that German government made it difficult for foreign correspondents to gather information.  
This German press system provided the foreign correspondents and domestic press with a 
couple of options to collect daily information about German policy and to ask questions. 
Historians Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld state that the Propaganda Ministry and 
Foreign Office provided three daily briefings for the press; however, these were only useful if 
one spoke German. American correspondents also found the ministries presented little 
                                                 
175
 Karl Bömer was fired in 1941, because he drunkenly spilled information about the possible top secret invasion of 
the Soviet Union at a Bulgarian legation in the spring of 1941. He was given a prison sentence after Joseph 
Goebbels stepped in with evidence to save him from the death penalty. Dr. Ernst Brauweiler took over his position 
after 1941. See Ernst K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda 1925-1945 (United States of 
America: Michigan State University Press, 1965), 115-16.  
176
 Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda 1925-1945, 116 and Ronald Smelser, “The Holocaust in 
the Popular Culture: Master-Narrative and Counter- Narratives in the Gray Zone,” in Gray Zones: Ambiguity and 
Compromise in the Holocaust and its Aftermath, ed. Jonathan Petropoulos and John K. Roth (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2005), 276. 
63 
information that could be useful for their newspapers.
177
 A reason for the lack of information at 
these conferences was not given. It also remains unclear if any of the correspondents from the 
Chicago Tribune or New York Times attended all of these press briefings. Probably, someone 
from the news bureau attended them in order to gather the information from the German 
government. 
There also existed the position of the Reichpressechef who was the press liaison for the 
“party organs.”178 Otto Dietrich held this position from 1931 to 1940; however, the foreign 
correspondents most likely did not interact with him. Ernst Hanfststaengl lead the Foreign Press 
section under the Reichpressechef, which meant he “was responsible for representing the Nazis 
party to the foreign press.”179 The relationship he had with the foreign press remains unclear 
based on the correspondents’ writing and articles. A definitive conclusion about their lack of 
writing cannot be made; however, most likely the correspondents had little interaction with him. 
If they had extensive meetings with him, it would have appeared in their writings or articles. 
Overall, the German press structure reinforces the idea that Germany was a dual state when the 
Nazis took control over the government. This meant that both the state and party organizations 
remain intact in order to govern Germany; however, both organizations were still based on Nazi 
ideology.
180
  
Clearly, the German press structure was designed to be complex and difficult to navigate. 
This system allowed the state to control information being made available to the domestic and 
foreign press, but also had experts keeping track of what was being written about Germany and 
the Nazis. Thus, it was another indirect way to protect the Nazis’ media image in the foreign 
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press without directly taking action against the foreign correspondents. Unknowingly, the many 
press divisions were also a source of opportunity for the correspondents, because it was difficult 
for them to coordinate and work together. Essentially, the German’s large and complex press 
system was a collective of press divisions without one leader to direct everything. It can be 
argued that the press division simply could not work together, because of their rivalry to attract 
more correspondents to their press conferences.
181
 The correspondents would need to have a full 
understanding of these organizations and departments in order to work around their press rules. 
This knowledge would have allowed them to find the loopholes in the system in order to 
manipulate it for their own means. More importantly, they needed to be aware of how the 
German press divisions collected information on them and their writing, because it could easily 
result in being expulsion from Germany  
The Chicago Tribune’s Berlin correspondent, Sigrid Schultz, continues to be the best 
example for how a correspondent operated in the German press system. She had multiple 
encounters with the Nazis over her critical reporting as early as 1934 and remained in Germany 
throughout the 1930s. From August of 1934 to 1939, she published about 1,000 news stories 
with 251 as front page articles about Germany.
182
 The increase in her front page articles is most 
likely related to the Nazis’ rise in power, but it cannot be fully explained through the political 
change. Probably, the political situation in Germany became more important for the United 
States; thus, the Chicago Tribune reported more news on its development. 
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Schultz’s volume of reporting meant she found a way to operate in the Nazis press 
system without giving them a reason to expel her. One should remember that Schultz was fluent 
in German and had an extensive network of contacts. This allowed her to develop relationships 
with important officials, such as United States Ambassador William Dodd and Reich Marshal 
Hermann Göring. Schultz rarely discussed in letters or articles on how her network informed her 
reporting, but it is clear how it helped her to avoid some conflicts with the German 
government.
183
 The Germans commonly used the threat of expulsion to silent any highly critical 
journalists. They also used written warnings; denial of telephone rights; suggestions to leave; 
expulsion for a couple of days; and threats of being charged for high treason.
184
 These 
punishments aimed to create an atmosphere of fear and obedience among the foreign journalists, 
but these punishments were highly dependent on the journalist’s nationality and gender.  
Schultz had layer of protection from the Germans’ wrath, because she was an American 
and a woman. If the Nazis caused any harm to an American citizen, it would cause an 
international incident between the two countries.
185
 In fact early on, the Nazis attempted to gain 
the approval of American correspondents by doing them favors, such as giving them extra 
rations.
186
 The aim was to influence the American correspondents into writing positive stories 
about the Nazis and Germany for the American public. Schultz was also protected as a woman, 
because of Nazis’ gender norms. Typically, the Nazis persecuted the men, while leaving the 
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women largely alone to handle the aftermath and fend for herself.
187
 Schultz learned how far she 
could push these layers of protection in her reporting, while also developing other ways around 
the Nazis’ rules. 
By 1934, Sigrid Schultz recognized the need for new approaches to survive in Nazi 
Germany as a reporter. Schultz purposely set-up a communication outlet in Prague by the start of 
1934 to get around some of the censorship. She chose to go through Prague, because Czecho-
Slovakia was a stable democratic country which made no attempt to censor her work and it was 
fairly close to Germany. This allowed her for a brief period of time to send detailed reports about 
Hitler and the Nazi Party from Prague.
188
 Schultz also realized quickly that she needed to 
increase further her security and to diversify her reporting methods to keep her articles well-
informed and remain off of the German radar.  
Schultz’s realization can be seen in her confidential letter written on July 20, 1935 to 
another foreign correspondent, George Seldes, in which she described how other reporters 
functioned in Germany and their situation.
189
 Seldes left the Chicago Tribune in 1928 to become 
a freelance reporter and writer so his location remains unclear, because he had no professional 
ties to any large newspaper. This letter was labeled as confidential and sent from Czecho-
Slovakia in an attempt to avoid the Nazis’ prying eyes. This meant Schultz most likely discussed 
freely the events in Germany, because the letter would probably not be read by the German 
government. In fact, she seemed more worried that all of her previous letters to him from the last 
winter only just arrived. Seldes also seemed to have been a friend of Schultz, because he was a 
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former Chicago Tribune’s foreign correspondent and due to her friendly demeanor toward him 
throughout the letter. She mentioned such things as reading his book and gave him some friendly 
professional advice about what he should write for his next article.
190
 Therefore, Schultz would 
not be afraid of being highly critical or to provide an accurate picture of the current reporting 
situation in Germany in this letter from 1935. She probably had the aim of gathering advice from 
a fellow veteran reporter on how to approach her situation. 
Schultz described how the Nazis were able to shape some of the other correspondents’ 
reporting through bribery and intimidation. Schultz’s basic observation was that the ordinary 
reporters could easily be influenced by the Nazi press system, even if they had the intention to 
report accurate news. An example of a subtle form of influence by the Nazis was providing 
Reichmarks to new reporters. The local currency was difficult for veteran journalists to find since 
their salaries were typically paid in dollars. Schultz contributed this to the Nazis trying to 
establish some rapport with the foreign reporters.
191
 
Schultz also explained her theory that some of the American news services were being 
paid by the Nazis to send back their approved news stories. Her evidence for the accusation was 
her previous negotiations with the German news services during the Weimar Republic. She 
attempted to set up an exchange of news stories with local German news services; however, it 
fell apart when the Germans demanded her to send “messages which they deemed of vital 
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importance” to the United States.192 She stated that the agreement with the government has some 
benefits, but it does come with the price of Nazi intimidation. 
Schultz speculated that at least William Randolph Hearst’s newspapers and United Press 
service (U.P.) had a news exchange with the Nazi government. This required the American news 
companies to follow Nazis’ press requests in order to remain in Germany and their favor. 
Schultz’s evidence of the Nazis’ influence was how each organization refused to hire Jews in 
Germany, because it would not meet with the approval of the Nazis. She also argued that the 
United Press would slip a sentence of Nazi propaganda into their reports. Her evidence was from 
her conversations with U.P. customers in Hungary, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia.
193
 This 
was only her observation about news services in Berlin and she even stated in reference to 
Hearst’s contract with the German government that “not seeing the Hearst Papers I do not know 
how it works out.”194 Her observations in this letter support her theory about the two newspaper 
services having a relationship with the Nazis, but they cannot be proven based solely on her 
word. The important aspect to consider about Schultz’s letter is that it speaks to the developing 
press situation in Germany, because it describes the type of pressures faced by the 
correspondents. 
More research needs to be done in order to establish this extreme of a case against any 
press service residing in Germany during the 1930s. It was only recently that historian Harriet 
Scharnberg made a connection between the Associated Press (A.P.) and the Nazis. She was able 
to use sources in Germany in order to describe the news exchange agreement between them. 
Essentially, the A.P. made an agreement with the Nazis to give them their news stories and 
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photos in order to remain in Berlin.
195
 This does not mean that the Hearst’s newspapers or the 
United Press services had the same agreement as the A.P-as Schultz charges-, but it shows that 
the Nazis were at least approaching these news services and their reporters with some sort of 
offer in order to influence what was written by the foreign correspondents. 
Schultz’s negative attitude towards this type of reporting indicates that she most likely 
avoided making any such agreements with the Nazis for the Chicago Tribune. She even stated 
that “the agencies which want to sell services in dictator infested countries [were] the really 
obedient people.”196 Schultz was avoided needing such an agreement with the Nazis and 
survived in Germany as a reporter. This was a testament to her abilities as a journalist, because 
her writing remained unchanged while the Nazis tighten a noose around the press’s freedom.   
 A blunt example of her critical nature is her article published on August 26, 1934, which 
was about Dorothy Thompson being asked to leave Germany in 1934 due to one paragraph in her 
interview with Hitler from 1931. Schultz’s article outright questioned Hitler’s press policy and 
actions by pointing out their inconsistencies through Thompson’s experience. Essentially, the 
German officials were able to argued based on the passage that Thompson wanted to hurt 
Germany’s reputation. A press law had been passed in 1932 that any person could be expelled if 
their intent was to harm Germany’s reputation can be proven. In the article, Schultz described 
Thompson’s view on her being asked to leave Germany by using multiple statements from 
Thompson. She quoted Thompson as saying, “I cannot forget that people were sent to 
concentration camps for saying about certain Strom Troop leaders the same things which Hitler 
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had later to say to the whole world in the [Reichstag].”197 Thompson was referring to the Night 
of Long Knives, which was when Hitler ordered the murder of the Stormtroopers’ leaders to 
minimize them as a political threat to his power.
198
 The act of Schultz reprinting Thompson’s 
statements on her front page article for the Tribune showed her unwavering support from 
Thompson’s point of view.   
Schultz reinforced Thompson’s conclusion by stating, “her departure was ordered despite 
the fact that the foreign office and the secret police were fully aware of the impression it was 
bound to create” for the world.199 She discussed how French and Soviet correspondents were 
expelled from Germany, but their respective governments also retaliated by expelling German 
correspondents from their countries.
200
 Clearly, Schultz was not afraid to question the Nazis’ 
policies or actions despite the fact that their power was only growing in Germany. Her criticisms 
of the regime did not soften either, but only became more critical in the next years. More 
importantly, the Chicago Tribune editors did not silent her criticisms by placing her articles on 
the front page. Many of them had fiery titles, such as the article on January 3, 1936, “Hitler 
Warns League to Mind Own Business” or the one on July 20, 1935, “Nazis Open New Drive to 
‘Purge’ Berlin of Jews.” 201  
 The Chicago Tribune editors would not have showcased Schultz’s articles if they did not 
have trust in her abilities as a journalist. Sigrid Schultz was one of the most well-informed 
American foreign correspondents, which allowed her to write critical articles at a time when the 
German censored and blocked others. A case in point was Schultz’s extensive knowledge about 
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Hitler’s future war plans. In a letter to Colonel McCormick on July 22, 1935, Schultz specifically 
stated that, “Germany does not want war right now.”202 This statement indicates that Schultz 
thought Germany had the aim to eventually wage war after 1935, which few people realized as 
Hitler’s intent. She based this conclusion on her talks with leaders of the German military forces, 
such as General von Beck and General von Reichenau. All of them told her it would take 
Germany several years to build up its power, but none of them denied the idea of war.
203
  
A couple of paragraphs later in this letter, Schultz hypothesized Hitler’s war plan for 
Europe. She argued that “Hitler want[ed] to swallow Lithuania, the main part of Poland, 
Bohemia and Austria.”204 She supported this theory with a suggestion that Germany was trying 
to reach a peace agreement with France in order to support the plan.
205
 Another article a year 
later had the title, “Germany seeks Deal on Austria with Mussolini: Coup in Vienna Excites Nazi 
Chieftains.”206 Schultz described Nazi Germany as aggressively attacking Eastern Europe, which 
was most likely based on her conversations with higher Nazis officials and observations of the 
European political landscape. Her letter or articles would not have been possible in 1935 if she 
did not develop her extensive sources of information. There was no way of knowing how many 
sources Schultz had in Germany, but her well-informed articles indicate that she had a lot of 
them. 
The average foreign correspondent in Germany from 1934 to 1936 would not be as well-
informed as Schultz about Hitler’s plans for Germany. As discussed, Schultz had the necessary 
network of contacts to provide her with the wealth of information and communication lines. It 
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also gave her the ability to socialize with the high Nazi officials in order to gain some insider 
information on events. Schultz was prepared to operate in the fully established Nazis press 
system, because of her language skills, journalistic drive, and cultural background.
207
 However, 
many of the other correspondents did not have Schultz’s background or upbringing to protect 
themselves from the Nazis. This left many of the reporters with a difficult choice of following 
the Nazis to at least get some of the news or to risk their careers with critical reporting. 
Ultimately, this was the choice of the New York Times correspondents who had very little 
protection, because of their owner’s Jewish heritage. 
 The New York Times News Bureau in Berlin after 1933 was operating under the 
assumption that the Nazis would shut them down any day. Its bureau at the start of 1933 
consisted of three main journalists with a couple of freelancers depending on the budget. Guido 
Enderis was still the Berlin Bureau’s chief. Frederick Birchall had recently been hired as the 
Times’ European Correspondent. He travelled all over Europe, but focused on Germany. Otto 
Tolishchus was also a recently hired as journalist in order to balance the bureau’s writing staff. 
These correspondents would produce the core of articles from Germany in the 1930s.
208
 
Frederick Birchall wrote a letter to the Times’ publishers, Mr. Sulzberger, in 1933 that he 
“confidently expect[ed] to see circulation of both The New York Times and The London Times 
prohibited in Germany.”209 The Times also had the added pressure of operating another business 
called Wide World Photos Inc. in Berlin, which sold photographs to other newspapers. By 1935, 
the German government started to ask the Times to prove their stockholders were of “Aryan” 
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descent and to replace their employees with Aryans in order to comply with German law.
210
 The 
Times also had to endure a negative campaign against their reporting. Case in point, a New York 
Times’s staff member wrote a letter on August 12, 1935 to an editor about how some of the New 
York Times editions were secretly confiscated by the Germans.
211
 The reason was not fully 
explained in the letter, but it shows the German government’s attitude towards the Times. A 
political cartoon also appeared in German that depicted the Times as a “Jewish foreign bully.” 212 
In that, the New York Times had a very uneasy relationship with the Nazis from the beginning, 
which would have left the foreign correspondents on thin ice.  
Most of this can be contributed to the fact that the New York Times was owned and 
published by a Jewish family. This meant that the Nazis already had prejudices against them, 
because they saw it as another Jewish threat in its borders.
213
 This only added more pressure to 
the journalists’ situation in Germany, because it limited the available sources of information to 
them. Most likely, they were subjected to the same rules as Jewish journalists, who were unable 
to use official Nazi channels for gathering news.
214
 This caused the New York Times 
correspondents to be in an impossible situation, because any wrong move would close down the 
bureau.  
Guido Enderis as the chief was, therefore, tasked with the job of keeping the doors open 
and correspondents’ safe with the Nazis breathing down their necks. In some sense, this is not a 
figure of speech. On April 30, 1934, Birchall wrote a very causal letter to Colonel Adler about 
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the Nazis’ shopcell in their workroom and a Nazis’ banner above their rented office.215 The way 
Enderis operated the bureau heavily influenced how the New York Times reported from Berlin, 
because he helped to manage what news was sent back to the United States. Most likely, he 
would have had the power to kill any story or at the very least delay any correspondents’ stories 
in order to make it less relevant to the situation in Germany. This would help him manage the 
relationship between the New York Times and the Nazis, because he could have shaped the 
reporting to be moderately critical on Germany and stay off the Nazis’ press radar. Ultimately, 
the answer to how moderate he was on the Nazis’ actions lays with his reporting after 1933.  
Leff argues that Guido Enderis was known for being sympathetic towards the Nazis’ 
point of view, which she contributed to his long residency in Berlin since World War I.
216
  This 
cannot be deduced fully from his articles, and more importantly, Leff ignores the full effects of 
him staying in Germany during the first World War. The fact that Enderis remained in Germany 
during it meant that he had some experience working with a hostile government. Enderis was 
classified as an internee after the United States entered the war; however, he was only required to 
live in the Adlon Hotel and report to the police once a day.
217
 Clearly, he had the skills to work 
with the government in order create a tolerable situation for himself and his newspaper. The 
reason Enderis may appear has pro-German was the fact he chose to work within the press rules 
in order to remain in Germany, while other correspondents pushed against them. Leff did not 
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entertain this possibility about Enderis; whiles less active and vocal as a journalist, his efforts 
helped to keep the New York Times open. 
The number of articles Enderis published on Germany dropped from about 84 articles in 
1933 to 40 in 1934 and his demeanor towards the German situation softened.
218
 In August of 
1934, Enderis published an article directly after Hitler consolidated his power in Germany in the 
aftermath of President Hindenburg’s death. This article described how Germany was slowly 
descending into political uncertainty. For his opening line, he stated, “The constitutional 
physiognomy of the Third Reich is quietly but unerringly resolving into an image of Adolf Hitler 
set in the frame of a one-party totalitarian State.”219 This does not describe Hitler’s rise to power 
as beneficial for Germany. Enderis only reinforces this image by questioning Hitler’s 
understanding “of fortifying his personal regime now that he decided to assume complete and 
undivided personal responsibility.”220 Clearly, Enderis had doubts about Hitler’s leadership for 
Germany based on his description of Hitler’s rise to power. He did not outright accuse Hitler of 
lacking the leadership skills for his position in Germany, but his language points to Enderis’ 
uncertainty.  
In the next two years, Enderis avoided being highly critical of Hitler and the German 
government. The lack of criticisms about Hitler is best seen in how he portrayed Hitler’s foreign 
policy from 1935 to 1936. In an article on February, 11, 1935, Enderis explained how Hitler 
reacted to a possible Anglo-French alliance by focusing on security concerns with the Soviet 
Union. He stated that Germany would only be concerned with the East, because it was “a 
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traditional foe of communism.”221 This makes it sound naturally that Germany would have 
conflict with Eastern Europe and provided a reasoning to Hitler’s demand for more leeway with 
the Treaty of Versailles.  
Another article published on October 12, 1935 described how Germany was not 
consulted by the League of Nations on the League’s sanctions against Italy.222 This article was 
published around the time Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935. The League decided to impose 
sanctions on Italy in order to stop its aggression towards Ethiopia.
223
 Enderis did not address the 
fact that Germany already left the League in 1933. He argued that Germany may follow 
Roosevelt’s new principle of neutrality, where the US could trade with “all belligerents,” in 
reaction to the lack of consultation.
224
  Enderis legitimized Germany’s reaction by referring to 
Roosevelt’s and Hitler’s foreign policy together. In both of these articles, Enderis was less 
critical of the Third Reich and showed his new, softened stance on German foreign policy.  
There is no definitive reason why Enderis started to pull back on his critical writing. 
Before making a judgement on Enderis’s reporting, it is important to note that he did criticize the 
Nazi Party in some of his published articles. His article on March 8, 1936 directly questioned 
Hitler’s long-term goals for the Rhinelands. Enderis described Hitler’s speech about the 
Rhineland as the “boldest utterance on German foreign policy.”225 Enderis also stated, “that the 
Rhineland zone would be Hitler’s next point of attack after the proclamation of conscription a 
year ago was no secret to those familiar with the intense passion with which he pursued his goal 
of completely restored German territorial integrity.”226 His description of Hitler’s foreign policy 
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goal clearly shows that Hitler intended to continue grabbing land and to challenge the other 
Western nations. It also showed that he understood the implication of Hitler’s actions. However, 
this is only a couple of paragraphs among many that discussed how Germany continued to work 
with other Western nations to keep the peace through collective security.
227
 Enderis’s reporting 
cannot be clearly defined as supporting the Nazis regime. It can be seen as uncritical, which may 
have been his intention so he could work with the Nazis and keep the New York Times operating 
in Berlin.  
Enderis chose to work with the German press rules instead of challenging them, which 
can be seen in his lackluster, uncritical articles about Germany. It is also very different from 
Schultz’s choice to work around the German press system. Enderis’s choice should not be solely 
defined as too pro-German like in Leff’s argument, because his working relationship with the 
Germans helped to keep the Times open.
228
 Enderis’s experience showed that somewhat 
following the Nazis’ rules could be a useful method of reporting. The fact remains that Enderis’s 
efforts allowed the bureau to remain open in the mid-1930s; thus, allowing other New York 
Times correspondents to keep reporting.  
The New York Times correspondents, Otto Tolishchus and Frederick Birchall, were meant 
to balance Enderis’s reporting by providing articles with a critical perspective on the Nazi 
regime.
229
 It is important to note that between 1934 to 1936 most of their critical articles were 
not “buried” in the back of the Times. Tolischus had 52 front page articles about Germany’s 
situation, while Birchall had 77 front page article in the New York Times.
230
 This does not mean 
that Germany’s situation was fully described in the newspapers, because it averaged to about 43 
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front page articles a year. Leff argues that the New York Times purposely avoided publicizing 
Jewish issues in Germany, because it would cause the paper to appear as a Jewish newspaper 
focused only on the Jewish plight in Germany.
231
 This argument is true, but it ignores what 
actually appeared on the front page of the New York Times and how it came to be published in 
the newspaper. A correspondent does not need to write about all political, social, and economic 
issues in Germany in order to signal its descent into an authoritarian state.  
An illustrative case in point is Otto Tolischus’s front page articles about foreign press 
issues in Germany. His article published on January 5, 1935 explained how foreign leaders were 
becoming worried about Germany, because the foreign press was “accused of spreading ‘lies’ 
about Nazi Germany or exaggerating ‘incidents.”232 Tolischus had a strong, detailed description 
on how the Nazis were treating some of the foreign press. He depicted the situation by describing 
it as “a violent campaign against the foreign press.”233 Later on, he stated that a “similar 
campaign against the foreign press preceded the anti-Jewish boycott in 1933 and the purge of 
June 30, 1934.”234 His article indicates that he was aware of pattern emerging against the foreign 
press in Germany, which influenced their reporting. It also shows that he thought more anti-
Jewish policy might be on the horizon. Tolischus does not provide any details on how far the 
Nazis censored the press, but it highlights why and when they decided to influence the news. 
Therefore, Tolischus showed how the Nazis were attempting to legitimize their actions for the 
other Western nations by keeping the public opposition to a minimum through the media.  
A couple of months later, Tolischus published other articles that described how freedom 
of the German press was disappearing under the Nazis. This did not directly affect the foreign 
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correspondents, but an important source of local information. On April 26, 1935, Tolischus’s 
published an article about how the Nazis were dismissing local editors and closing the remaining 
independent local newspapers. He argued that the newspapers were crushed by three press laws, 
because the German government thought that these newspapers were control by “special and 
anonymous interests.”235 Tolischus was precise about how this would affect the German press. In 
his opening line, he stated the orders were “designed to make the National Socialist press 
supreme” in Germany.236 Tolischus also asserted that “a morsel of news or argument [could] not 
[be] found in any Nazi newspaper.”237  He even stated that, “German press is not the voice of the 
German people.”238 Essentially, Tolischus described how Germans lost the freedom of their 
press, which, in turn, compromised the local information available to correspondents. His 
criticism of the Nazis’ press policy did not stop either, in fact it only grew in the next year. 
Tolischus critical reporting was also made possible by Enderis’s work with the Nazis, which kept 
the New York Times Berlin bureau open.  
In August of 1935, Tolischus published another article that described how the Economic 
Minister, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, complained to Hitler about his speech being censored in the 
German press. According to Tolischus, his speech “denounced the disturbances of German 
business by National Socialist extremists, economic dilettantes and saboteurs.”239 Tolischus 
argued that it “developed today into a thinly disguised conflict between Dr. Schacht and Dr. 
Joseph Goebbels, Propaganda Minister,” over freedom of speech.240 The German government 
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clearly wanted to project an image of peaceful governing and its policies being whole-heartedly 
supported to the press. Therefore, Tolischus provided the evidence to question if the German 
newspapers or even the official Nazi government message reflected the situation in Germany. It 
also showed that there was some disagreement among the German governmental official about 
the Nazis’ agenda. More importantly, the German government was attempting to keep it silent.  
These articles show how the local German press was manipulated to follow the Nazis’ 
guidelines. There is no definitive way of knowing who read these Tolischus’s articles in the 
newspapers, but they were attacking how the Nazis shaped its media image of Germany to the 
world. Tolischus would not have been able to write these articles if he had not been an observant 
reporter and capable of working around the press system. The New York Times showed its 
support by placing almost all of these articles on the front page of its newspaper expect for the 
last one discussed.
241
 It was attempting to communicate some aspects of how the Nazis were 
changing Germany into an authoritarian state despite its risky situation. But, Otto D. Tolischus 
was not the only journalists it employed who wrote critical articles of the Nazis and Germany. 
Frederick T. Birchall was the other New York Times foreign correspondent whose reports 
from Nazi Germany often appeared on the front page. Leff described his reporting as being well-
known for its criticism of Nazi Germany. In fact, Arthur Sulzberger commented that Birchall’s 
writing added a sense of legitimacy to the New York Times, because of the Pulitzer Award he 
received in 1934 for his reporting in Germany.
242
 An illustrative case is his article published on 
July 25, 1935, in which he accused the Nazis of abusing foreign correspondent in order to cover 
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up anti-Semitic events. Birchall argued that the German press described themselves as victims of 
“the foreign campaign of lies.”243 He goes on to state that “some form of reprisal may be 
attempted upon some who have reported what they saw plainly.”244 Reprisal was not fully 
defined by Birchall in his article; however, it indicated that the German government was taking 
some action against foreign correspondents. More importantly, it suggests how the Times 
legitimized its general reporting about Germany through the use of Birchall’s notoriety and 
article placement. 
Another article by Birchall on April 21, 1935 described how the Nazis claimed that other 
Western nations lacked the right to judge Germany. This article was published when the League 
of Nations attempted to place sanctions on Germany due to its rearmament program, which 
Hitler decided to speed up. Birchall explained how Germany position has been “converted into 
open, active antagonism.”245 He argued that “nothing [was] left to prevent the division of Europe 
into tow hostile camps each arming to top capacity.”246 This article described how Hitler 
challenged the status quo in Europe and how it caused political instability. Thus, Birchall’s 
reporting became more observant of what was happening in Germany after Hitler solidified his 
power in August of 1934. His articles detailed how the Nazis aggressively implemented their 
goals; however, how did he avoid the German censors? 
Birchall was the Chief European Correspondent for the New York Times, which meant he 
had to travel in and out of Germany to cover the rest of Europe. Some of the other cities he 
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frequented were Geneva and London.
247
 Leff did not fully analyze Birchall’s unique traveling 
situation and what it meant for the New York Times. She simply wrote that Enderis’s relationship 
with the German government helped Birchall to travel around Europe and still report from 
Germany.
248
 Essentially, Leff acknowledges the correspondents’ situations and roles, but failed 
to explore the full implications on their articles. Birchall’s traveling put him in an awkward 
position, because he needed the German government’s permission to travel back and forth to 
Germany. If the Nazis were to take one of his articles the wrong way, his career in Germany 
could be ended, because the Nazis could easily deny him reentry. However, traveling also 
allowed him to send his material in other countries and avoid any censors. He was one of the few 
New York Times correspondent who mentioned sending confidential material to the US after 
leaving Germany’s borders.249  
Birchall also attempted to protect his name in 1936 by having the publisher use other 
names or remove his byline from the articles. He never mentioned his aliases, which means that 
many of his articles cannot be traced.
250
 Nevertheless, his continuation of critical articles under 
Birchall is proof that the New York Times’s relationship with the German government was at 
least functional at the start of the Nazi regime. More importantly, it showed that the relationship 
and Enderis’s role needs to be examined closely in order to understand fully how the Times 
reported from Berlin. Leff only examined the final product of the newspaper without considering 
how correspondents changed their reporting in respects to this relationship. The number of 
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articles about Germany by Birchall, Tolischus, and Enderis showed how the Times needed to 
change its reporting after Hitler took full control.  
The only aspect that can be certain is 134 articles were published on the front page of the 
newspaper by two critical journalists, which does not amount to much for a daily newspaper. 
One should consider, though, that the New York Times first priority was to cover domestic news. 
The entire bureau’s staff was also well aware of their situation with the German government’s 
anti-Jewish policies. Each one played a defined role in this situation that affected their individual 
reporting. Overall, the New York Times was able to fight off any ban, expulsion, and arrest by the 
Nazis; however, it came at the cost of having fewer critical articles available for the newspaper.  
 The correspondents in Germany were not the only ones that faced press restrictions from 
1934 to 1936 due to Europe’s political situation. Hitler kept violating the terms in the Versailles 
Treaty throughout the 1930s in order to make Germany strong again and solidify his power with 
the German people. European countries depended on the Treaty’s terms to protect the fragile 
peace. France and Great Britain attempted to work with Hitler by appeasing most of his 
demands, because domestic issues from the Great Depression were more pressing.
251
 These 
countries’ relationships with Germany were an important indicator of how strained Europe’s 
political atmosphere was becoming in the 1930s. The way foreign correspondents were treated in 
other European countries showed how concerned they were about Germany and for the chance of 
war.    
 Both the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times had large news bureaus in London; it 
was one of the few cities that did not show signs of attempting to control foreign correspondents’ 
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articles.
252
 It seemed to be an avenue for correspondents to send censor-free communications in 
the early 1930s. In fact, Sigrid Schultz described in a letter from 1934 how the Chicago 
Tribune’s London office was efficient at cabling her stories back to the United States with the 
correct wording.
253
 London correspondents did not mention any issues about producing stories 
expect for ones about the British Royal family. In the mid-1930s, the British Royal family was 
experiencing a scandal, because King Edward VIII was courting Wally Simpson who was 
American and divorced. The Chicago Tribune’s chief London correspondent, David Darrah, 
published an article on October 23, 1936 that described how the British government threatened 
the British press in order to enforce an “unofficial” censorship.254 Besides local censorship, the 
London correspondents did not voice any real concerns about their reporting situation; thus, 
making it a life line for correspondents in heavily censored areas like Germany. Nevertheless, 
few correspondents were able to use the lifeline.  
The simple answer is that London was off on an island; thus, correspondents could not 
easily send material to their respective countries. Schultz would not have set up a communication 
route to the US in Prague if she could simply phone her stories to London from Berlin. Most 
likely, a correspondent in continental Europe would send a human messenger to London or travel 
outside of their respective country for an uncensored communication line to Great Britain. Safe 
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communication resources in continental Europe became crucial for all correspondents in order to 
publish uncensored news and to stay ahead of the developing events. Ultimately, the individual 
correspondents had to evaluate their available communication outlets on whether or not they 
could be trusted.   
For many correspondents, France became their cheap and quick communication route, 
but it did have another cost. France implemented several ways to censor foreign correspondents 
by 1935. The Chicago Tribune Paris correspondent, Edmund Taylor, described in a letter on 
April 30, 1935 how the French government thought that censorship could help prevent foreign 
attacks. He stated that “the French are apt to fall into occasional fits of hysteria in which they 
lock upon every foreigner as a probably spy.”255  The reason for the censorship and other press 
rules in 1935 could be contributed to France’s and Germany’s tense relationship after World War 
I. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, France attempted to secure itself from another potential 
German attack on their land.
256
 It could also be attributed to France’s host of domestic issues 
from the Great Depression that the government struggled to solve and the country’s reluctance to 
be pulled into yet another war.
257
  
The effects of French censorship on the correspondents’ writing remain unclear based on 
the correspondents’ articles and private papers; however, they say plenty about their 
communication lines. The Paris News Bureaus of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune had 
limited options to communicate articles back to the United States by 1935. In 1934, Schultz 
wrote a letter that explained how the New York Times correspondent, Frederick Birchall, sent his 
articles through Paris with orders to the cable editors not to have any of his writing touched or 
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changed.
258
 Clearly, the New York Times at least had some issues with the French office 
changing their text while cabling it back to the US. For the correspondents in Germany, one 
wrong word could have meant expulsion or, even worse, being arrested by the Nazis. 
The Chicago Tribune correspondents in Paris did not fare much better than the Times. 
About a year later, the Tribune correspondent for Paris, Edmund Taylor, wrote several letters 
that explained how he could avoid French censorship by phoning stories to London.
259
 He was 
the correspondent discussed earlier who had issues with getting his “mailer stories” across 
German borders in France.
260
 In this letter, he does not provide a reasoning why the French 
government left the phone lines still available; in fact, he does not understand it himself.
261
 
Ultimately, the French government was simply getting ahead of itself by placing restrictions on 
foreigners, which would not be abnormal in a war situation. This showed the kind of anxiety the 
French had over the political atmosphere in Europe by 1935, but also how it affected 
communication lines for foreign correspondents. This did not only impact correspondents in 
France, but rippled across to other news bureaus who had limited communication lines.      
 The correspondents assigned to Soviet Union were the ones with the most limited 
communication lines and source networks. It is well-known that the Soviet government heavily 
censored its domestic newspapers throughout the 1930s in order to control information in it’s the 
country.
262
 The foreign correspondents had to work within a strict press censor system enforced 
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by the Soviet government, but the Chicago Tribune and New York Times correspondents had 
minimal interaction with it throughout the 1930s. Both of them were unable to assign a steady 
correspondent to the Soviet Union throughout the 1930s.
263
  
 The Chicago Tribune did not have a correspondent stationed in the Soviet Union, because 
the assigned one, Donald Day, could not enter the country. Therefore, Day became the Northern 
European foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune. He would report from countries such 
as Poland and Latvia in order to get the news from the Soviet Union.
264
 He argued that the Soviet 
government refused to allow him in the country since 1920, because of his critical writing and 
attitude towards communism. He also did not sign the press agreement that he would submit his 
work to Soviet censors.
265
 However, this was Day’s opinion on why he could not enter the 
country. The Soviet government could have had any number of issues with Day’s reporting. At 
any rate, the Chicago Tribune was unable to receive direct news about how the Soviet Union 
reacted to Nazis’ policies unless it was filtered through Latvia. The New York Times did not fare 
much better with keeping a correspondent in Moscow. Their correspondent Harold Denny was 
expelled from the Soviet Union in 1937. It remains unclear why Denny’s articles were cause for 
him to be unwelcomed in the Soviet Union.
266
 Ultimately, it left the Times without a steady 
reporter in Moscow until 1939.   
The treatment of reporters in other European countries is somewhat of an indicator of 
how tense the political atmosphere was becoming in the 1930s. The shifts in the political 
                                                 
263
 For list of reporters in Eastern Europe for the New York Times see Leff, Buried in the Times, xiv-xv. 
264
 For an example of Day’s article from the cites see Donald Day, “Moscow Masses Two Armies for Invasion of 
Poland,” Chicago Tribune, September 28, 1938, 1; Donald Day, “Polish-German Alliance Forms Against Russia,” 
Chicago Tribune, February 24, 1938, 4; Donald Day, “Russian Drive Checked After 8 Day Battle,” Chicago 
Tribune, February 10, 1940, 1. 
265
 Donald Day, Onward Christian Soldiers: 1920-1942: Propaganda, Censorship and One Man’s struggle to 
Herald the Truth (Torrance, Calif: Noontide Press, 1982), iv-v, 107-109. 
266
 Sulzberger to Denny October 6, 1937 and Telegram on September 29, 1937, New York Public Library, New York 
Times: Arthur Hays Sulzberger Papers, Box 208, Folder 16. 
88 
situation of Europe strongly affected correspondents’ positions and, subsequently, 
communication outlets. France became worried that the country maybe infested with 
correspondents as foreign spies. The Soviet Union did not provide an opportunity for the 
newspapers’ correspondents to report directly from the country. Great Britain was a lifeline for 
censor-free communication; however, it was out of reach for most correspondents. Ultimately, 
this era of appeasement measures began to change in 1936. This was when the European political 
atmosphere became politically tense, because the countries descended into a fast pace 
rearmament race.   
 By the end of 1936, Europe’s political atmosphere reached a crucial turning point that set 
it on path for war. On March 29, 1936, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland with the approval of 
the German people. A few month later, Spain was in the middle of a Civil War. Mussolini and 
Hitler provided support to the Spanish Fascist; therefore, it helped to cement a friendship and 
alliance between Germany and Italy. More importantly, the Nazis were becoming more 
aggressive in their foreign policy by the start of 1937, because they shifted their focus from 
maintaining peace with other European to gaining new “living space” and quickened their 
rearmament. Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy can be contributed to his perception that other 
European nations would do anything to avoid war. This led to such events as the annexation of 
Austria in 1938, Germany’s seizure of the Sudetenlands and eventual full invasion of what 
remained of Czechoslovakia in early 1939.
267
  
The press regulations and censorship also increased progressively, but did not start until 
after the Nazis finished hosting the Olympics of 1936. The Nazis used the Olympics as a stage to 
influence the world’s image of Germany by hiding their treatment of Jews. The foreign press 
regulations increased substantially after the Olympics concluded in Germany. The foreign 
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correspondents in Germany were one of the few groups of foreigners able to see the effects of 
Hitler’s foreign policy; however, it did not necessarily mean they were able to report it.268   
 Sigrid Schultz’s reporting illustrates how reporters after 1936 needed to take even more 
extreme measures in order to keep writing critical articles, while being allowed to remain in 
Germany.
269
 It should be kept in mind that Schultz already used networks of sources and 
communication outlets outside of Germany. Her letters and articles after the summer Olympics 
indicated how much the press situation had changed in Germany. On October 1936, Schultz 
wrote a letter to the Tribune cable editor George Scharschug that described what happened to her 
editorial story on the “June Blood Purge’s” history and its effects.270 This letter is referring to the 
Night of Long Knives in June of 1934, which was when Hitler ordered the killing of Röhm and 
other top SA leaders. This order allowed Hitler to further consolidate Nazis’ power in Germany, 
because he eliminated political enemies and instilled fear.
271
 Schultz knew that this type of story 
would put her into trouble with the Nazis; therefore, she had to take steps in order to hide her 
authorship.  
 In Schultz’s letter on October 1, 1936, she described how she could end up in trouble 
with the Nazis, because they may have been informed about her order to write the “June Blood 
Purge’s” article and her plan to avoid being accused. First off, she planned to send a separate 
letter stating “no new material [was] available in Germany [,] I can’t see my way to writing the 
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Blood Purge.”272 She argued this was necessary, because the Tribune’s London correspondent 
David Darrah’s written order for her to write the article was intercepted by the Nazis. She also 
made a point to ask for the article to be published under a different name, which “sound pretty 
real to our dear Nazi snoopers.”273 This was the first time Schultz mentioned using a different 
name in order to hide her identity from the Nazis. Her reason was that “[she] want[ed] to give 
our readers all the dope there is, but [she is] perfectly willing to hide behind somebody’s name or 
coat.”274 Ultimately, this meant Schultz needed to detach herself completely from any articles 
that would upset the Nazis in order to remain a reporter in Berlin. If the Nazis could connect her 
to the articles, Schultz would have been easily expelled or, even worse, arrested.  
 Schultz hid her identity by using a male pseudonym, John Dickson, to write some 
articles. She started using this name when she published her June Blood Purge article in 
November of 1936. Based on her letter in October, she did not seem to pick this name herself; 
however, she kept it until the end of 1939.
275
 The use of a male pseudonym showed how male 
reporters were more respected when it came to writing critical articles, because it would have 
been easy for someone to choose a female name. More importantly, the editors recognized the 
importance of her work, because few of these articles were not on the front page.
276
 The June 
Blood Purge article in 1934 argued that this was when democracy ended in Germany. She also 
described in detail how Hitler’s rule changed the lives of the average German for the worse, 
because of the constant fear of being arrested by the Gestapo. She argued that their “relatives and 
friends are silent, but the rumor of mysterious disappearances is enough to enforce the silence 
                                                 
272
 Sigrid Schultz to George Scharschug on October 1, 1936.  
273
 Sigrid Schultz to George Scharschug on October 1, 1936. 
274
 Sigrid Schultz to George Scharschug on October 1, 1936. 
275
 John Dickson, “Pledge to Czechs Broken,” Chicago Tribune, PHN, December 17, 1939, 16. 
276
 For examples of Dickson’s first page articles see John Dickson, “Germany to Put 1,500,000 Men into ‘War 
Game,’” Chicago Tribune, PHN, August 7th, 1938, 1; John Dickson, “Hitler Terror Grips Nation; Unrest Mounts,” 
Chicago Tribune, PHN, September 14
th
 1938, 1; and John Dickson, “When Liberty Dies!,” Chicago Tribune, PHN, 
January 8, 1939, 1. 
91 
desired by the men in power.”277 Later on, she described how these executions of SA leaders 
were simply a way for lesser Nazis officials to “vent their blood lust and do away with those they 
fear or hate.”278 In this article she showed that the Nazis’ rule was built on terror and fear for 
everyone to see if they took the time. She continued to provide evidence to support this 
conclusion by using Dickson’s name throughout the late 1930s.  
Schultz protected her pseudonym from the Nazis by trying to make Dickson a real person 
who lived outside of Germany. This would be crucial for her safety, because any hard evidence 
that Schultz was Dickson could have easily led to her arrest. She distanced herself by doing such 
things as writing in her diary “Trib front page that fellow Dickson wonder who he is.”279 She 
also signed letters under his name and approved other journalists’ articles.280 She even had the 
editors mark the articles as published in Denmark in order to keep the ruse with the Nazis that 
John Dickson was an actual Chicago Tribune correspondent outside of Germany.
281
 All of these 
precautions to protect her identity after 1936 showed that even Schultz was becoming fearful of 
being expelled or arrested based on her articles. It also showed that simple little changes were 
enough to elude the Nazis before the war and keep writing. The proof is in how Schultz’s second 
byline allowed her the freedom to write about political chaos developing in Europe for the time 
being; however, the Nazis continued to keep her reporting under a microscope. 
On May 11, 1939, Sigrid Schultz wrote a letter to Robert McCormick about how difficult 
it was to send her articles from Germany. She explained how many of her articles were arriving 
too late in order to be of any use for the newspaper. She had to trust a mail courier to forward the 
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letters, because her mail would have been stopped by the Germans. This meant that she was 
dependent on mail instead of telephone or cabling, which created the lag in sending her 
material.
282
 Most likely, the problem was that Schultz did not have a safe communication route 
after Czechoslovakia was invaded and taken over by the Nazis. This had been Schultz’s main 
communication outlet since 1934.
283
 Schultz had few options to send uncensored articles in an 
efficient and timely manner, which made her reporting less relevant to the situation. This was not 
due to her choices as a journalist, because Schultz actively attempted to find ways around the 
German press system. Schultz was severely limited by the options available to her in Germany. 
Unfortunately, this was also the time when her reporting and observations were becoming more 
important to Americans, because it provided insight into Germany’s readiness for war.  
 The situation for the New York Times correspondents in Germany did not significantly 
change after 1936, because the company already had a precarious relationship with Nazi 
Germany.
284
 Otto Tolischus and Fredrick Birchall kept attempting to report from Germany; 
however, it steadily became tougher for them not to be expelled. Together, Tolischus and 
Birchall had about 100 front page articles published between 1936 to September of 1939.
285
  The 
only change was the number of issues the reporters had with the Nazis, which can be attributed 
to the lack of protection they had from Nazis’ wrath.  
Leff describes, for example, how Birchall was almost not allowed back into Germany to 
cover the Olympics for the Times. Enderis was the only reason Birchall was able to re-enter 
Germany in 1936. He developed a plan where Birchall left Germany for a couple days to let 
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things cool down. Birchall would then return to Germany in order to write some nonpolitical 
pieces that would please the Nazi officials. This would allow the Nazis to forget about Birchall’s 
earlier articles. Leff argues that this plan worked at least for the Olympics, because Birchall was 
able to come back to Germany.
286
 Clearly, Birchall was on Nazis’ radar for his previous articles, 
which meant one wrong move could expel him indefinitely. There was no clear reason why the 
Nazis did not expel him like the other journalists, such as Dorothy Thompson, expect for 
Enderis’s ability to compromise.287  
Otto Tolischus was not in a much better situation with the German government. Leff 
shows that Toliscchus was almost expelled several times, because of his articles about the 
German press’s situation and his conclusions about Germany’s foreign policy in 1937 and 1938. 
His articles were offensive enough for him to be called into the German Foreign Office’s press 
department, which meant a possible expulsion. Again, Guido Enderis was the only reason 
Tolischus could remain in Germany for the time being. Leff describes that Enderis talked to 
several German officials who were willing to look the other way on Tolischus’s reporting.288  
The number of issues New York Times correspondents were having in Germany suggests 
that their days in Germany were numbered. Enderis could only protect the correspondents to a 
certain point. This means that the correspondents had a choice to either keep reporting with the 
same level of criticism or to find a way to work within the German press rules to remain in 
Germany. Clearly, the Birchall and Tolischus chose the former based on their many conflicts 
with the Nazis. This choice allowed the New York Times for a brief period of time to report some 
of the news about the reality in Germany; however, it only lasted as long as Enderis had a good 
relationship with the Germans.  
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 It became crucial between 1934 to 1939 for the correspondents to learn how far they 
could push the press rules in their respective countries. From 1934 to 1939, it became clear to the 
foreign correspondents that they were faced with a choice because they were entering a new era 
of journalism. They could either follow the new state press rules throughout Europe or work 
around them. As one can see from the Chicago Tribune and New York Times correspondents, the 
answer was dependent on a lot of different factors. Schultz was able to provide accurate reports, 
because she had the capabilities to operate under the Nazis radar. Unfortunately, the New York 
Times correspondents were under the Nazis’ microscope from the very beginning, because of its 
owner. 
These foreign correspondents were also seen as a potential enemy in their host countries, 
because they were eye witnesses with a speaking platform that could influence people. The Nazis 
attempted to sway the American foreign correspondents’ opinion to portray a stable government 
to the United States. However, much of this gave way after 1936, when Hitler’s foreign policy 
became more aggressive. This then led to a harsher campaign against the press in terms of 
censorship and restriction of information in order to keep a tight watch over the information.  
Ultimately, the correspondent who took the risk to work around the press system 
provided the most accurate news. The best example of this type of reporter was Sigrid Schultz 
who took the risk and initiative to inform fully the American public. However, the 
correspondents who worked within the rules should not be completely written off, because they 
remained in their respective countries and reported something. The German press rules were 
slowly spreading across Europe, because Germany took over lands in Eastern Europe. And when 
the Nazis invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, it caused a significant shift in the foreign 
correspondents’ situation, because it transformed them into war correspondents.   
95 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE WAR CORRESPONDENTS FROM 1939 TO 1941 
“I was the last correspondent to leave Poland and have a most complete and exclusive 
eyewitness story of Poland’s collapse, including 20 days’ experience as a refugee in east Poland, 
cut off from all communication.”289 
Alex Small (Chicago Tribune Correspondent) on September 28, 1939 
 The foreign correspondents’ situation completely changed the moment when the 
Wehrmacht crossed the border into Poland and began their campaign against the Polish army on 
September 1, 1939.
290
 Most correspondents found themselves operating from waring countries, 
which meant harsh press regulations, and even in some cases threats against their lives. The 
correspondents came to be seen as foreign agents who needed to be controlled. The Chicago 
Tribune’s correspondent, Sigrid Schultz, wrote a letter on October 8, 1940 that described how 
desperate her situation in Berlin had become in the last couple of months. She stated, “I have 
violated no laws, but this constant attempt to trap me at times seemed more than I could cope 
with. I was even denounced as being Jewish…”291 A couple of paragraphs later she wrote, “It is 
true it is not officially proclaimed censorship, but this kind of self-imposed censorship is 
exceedingly hard to cope with, especially when every few days we are told we must remember 
the high treason and treason legislation.”292 Schultz was facing a new level of scrutiny by the 
Nazis, which caused her to doubt her ability to report from Berlin and even her safety.  
This was one of the first times Schultz showed that her nerves were beginning to fray 
under the Nazis’ pressure. If the pressure affected such a veteran reporter, other reporters most 
likely found themselves in a similar situation. This begs the question whether correspondents 
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could even report from Europe after September 1, 1939. Was there any value in them risking 
their lives in order to send reports home? These correspondents were the few foreign witnesses 
to the early events in World War II. They helped to shape how the war was perceived by the 
American public; however, their reporting capabilities were very much subjected to the tides of 
the war. The correspondents’ communication network became more limited from 1939 to 1941, 
because few countries allowed quick and uncensored telegraphing for journalists. This 
compromised their ability to report up to date news about the war in Europe.  
For most of 1939 to 1941, the German army was winning the war. Germany’s military 
strategy-blitzkrieg- or lightening war allowed the army to easily overwhelm the majority of its 
enemies by striking quickly to catch its enemy off guard and, thus, overwhelm its defenses.
293
 
This strategy was also supported by Germany signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet 
Union in 1939. This agreement dictated that the two nation would not attack each other and split 
parts of Eastern Europe.
294
 This strategy quickly overwhelmed Poland’s and France’s defenses in 
the beginning of war. Parts of Poland were annexed by the Soviet Union and Germany at the end 
of September, while France’s defenses failed to repel the German forces in May of 1940 after six 
weeks of fighting. This led it to part of France becoming a puppet state for the German 
government, which was known as Vichy France and led by Marshal Philippe Pétain. The other 
part of France had some autonomy from Vichy France.
295
 This effectively left Great Britain 
alone to wage a war against Germany in one of the most deadly aerial fights. By June of 1940, 
Great Britain’s war efforts were only sustained by the United States’ Lead-Lease Act of 1941 
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and modifications to the US Neutrality Laws, which provided access to the much needed military 
supplies.
296
  
By December of 1940, Hitler was confident enough to make plans for the invasion of the 
Soviet Union, otherwise codenamed as “Operation Barbarossa.” This campaign was initially 
successful for the German army; it drove deeply into Soviet territory. Nevertheless, the Soviet 
Union never collapsed and continued to fight. The German army was also plagued by supply line 
issues. About a year after this invasion, this war became a true World War after the Japan’s 
attack on Pearl Harbor. To support its alliance with Japan, Germany would declare war on the 
United States on December 11, 1941.
297
 
The American public was desperate for any news about how the war was developing in 
Europe between 1939 and 1941. The newspapers were one of the few sources of information; 
however, the foreign correspondents’ reporting was subjected to the tides of war. Many of them 
had to flee their respective countries for their own safety. This opens up the question how the 
correspondents could still report about Europe, while remaining in their respective countries.  
Ultimately, the correspondents, who remained in Europe, had a choice to make about their 
reporting. They could either conform to the government’s press rules, which gave them some 
sense of security. The other option would be to find a way around them without being expelled.  
A judgement should not be passed on either choice, because reporting from war engulfed 
Europe required journalists to step into a new role of war correspondent. This was not a simple 
change of title, but required the reporters to learn how to write under war conditions and with 
few resources. As the German army took over Europe, the countries with efficient and censor-
free communication for journalists’ articles decreased. The correspondents would have to leave 
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the German-occupied territories and travel to neutral countries, however, there was no guarantee 
of being allowed back into their respective countries. Even more so, the reports may never make 
it to the United States in time to be relevant news. This meant that most of the correspondents 
were operating in an impossible situation, which left many of them useless or barely able to 
report the basic news. Thus, the image of the war was shaped by not only the correspondents’ 
choices in reporting, but also their luck and location. 
 The remaining correspondents of both the Chicago Tribune and New York Times Berlin 
News Bureaus were able to report until Germany declared war on the United States on December 
11, 1941. After the declaration of war, the foreign correspondents were effectively enemy aliens, 
which forced the news bureaus to close. The next section highlights how the correspondents’ 
situation changed after war was declared in 1939 and how chance influenced their ability to keep 
writing for the American public.  
 It should be no surprise how quickly Chicago Tribune correspondent, Sigrid Schultz, 
reacted to the German invasion of Poland and her efficiency in reporting the breaking news. She 
woke up another fellow American foreign correspondent, William Shirer, at 6 A.M. on 
September 1, 1939 by telephone in order to inform him that the war had begun.
298
 Clearly, she 
wanted to get the word out to other foreign correspondents. Schultz started her reporting on the 
war with the same level of enthusiasm and journalistic drive as beforehand. In fact, she wrote 
one of the first front page articles about the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, 
which meant her report had to be written and sent before the newspapers were printed.
299
 Her 
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journalistic energy quickly changed over the next months into depression and somewhat 
hopelessness from the strict press situation in Germany. Schultz had never exhibited such an 
attitude about her situation before 1939, which suggests that even veteran reporters could not 
function well under Nazis’ wartime press rules.   
 Sigrid Schultz wrote fewer and fewer articles for the Chicago Tribune from 1939 to 
1941. She published 375 articles about the situation in Germany in this time span. This number 
may seem large, but it does not even compare to her other years. Schultz wrote 936 articles from 
1936 to 1939 and 812 articles from 1936 to 1939.
300
 This large decrease in her writing can be 
attributed to how quickly the press’s situation fell apart in Germany due to the demands of war 
and the German wartime culture. The correspondents’ ability to report from German-controlled 
territories was slowly restricted by its war time measure.  
Schultz’s situation in Germany was changed by its wartime measures over a couple of 
months. Firstly, the usual communication routes that served Schultz and the rest of the Chicago 
Tribune correspondents were cut off by October. Schultz wrote a letter to the Chicago Tribune 
editor, George Scharachug, on October 25, 1939 that discussed how “the whole of [her] carefully 
built up organization went to pieces.”301 She described an incident where the Press Wireless, a 
local messaging company, claimed that her article could be sent to the United States from Berlin 
in a matter of an hour; however, it was delayed to the point where it became useless. A couple of 
hours after sending it, she received several phone calls from the post office about her article not 
being sent and there was also no way of contacting the Press Wireless about it.
302
 The post office 
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had to be run by low level Nazis officials, who would had some sort of orders from the 
government to delay Schultz’s message back to the US. Schultz’s solution to avoid such issues 
was to set up a telephone line from Berlin to Copenhagen, Denmark. She had to pay a relay man 
in Copenhagen about 100 dollars a month to send Chicago Tribune’s articles to the United 
States. Unfortunately, this was not the only issue Schultz encountered after the German invasion 
of Poland.
303
  
Schultz also complained to Scharachug about how the OKH did not allow her to visit the 
front. This letter does not give an explicit reason why Schultz was kept away from the front, but 
suggests it may be an issue with the fact she was a woman. Therefore, Schultz had to hire a 
relatively unknown journalist, John Raleigh, to cover stories from the front. Raleigh could hardly 
speak German and had to ride a bicycle across Germany to even arrive at the Tribune’s Berlin 
office. Schultz stated that he was knowledgeable about the military, but his lack of German hurt 
his ability to report.
304
 She did not have much of a choice since he was allowed near the front and 
she was denied. The Germans also may not have wanted Schultz on the front, because of her 
previous articles. These two reporting issues affected how Schultz was able to communicate and 
to find sources for her articles, which affected her ability to write them. It was up to the 
individual correspondent to find ways around them, even if it meant hiring a non-qualified, male 
journalist.  
Schultz’s other correspondence with Scharschug and Chicago Tribune editor Maloney 
illuminates a more important problem for the newspaper. Schultz wrote a telegram on November 
29, 1939, in which she described her worry about the Chicago Tribune publishing a falsified 
report sent from Europe. She stated that the fabricated article was about “Hitler’s bodyguards’ 
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bullet-proof vests and Fritsch’s death.”305 Based on her description, there is no way of knowing 
if the article was published by the newspaper. The publication of this article did not worry 
Schultz as much as its threat to the Tribune’s telephoning privileges in Germany. She did not 
know who could be the imposter, but anything sent by him could endanger the foreign 
correspondents.
306
 If the Tribune lost easy access to the telephone, the last remaining express 
communication route would be firmly cut off. In the extreme case, a fake article could cause the 
correspondents to be faced with expulsion from Germany or criminal charges. This only added to 
the atmosphere of paranoia and worry for the correspondents. Unfortunately, the situation did not 
improve for Sigrid Schultz, but only became more dangerous.  
In February 10, 1940, Sigrid Schultz wrote a letter under the name of John Dickson to 
McCormick that explained how correspondents were coming under heavy Nazi suspicion. There 
was no indication in the letter on why Schultz decided to use Dickson at this particular time. The 
very fact that Schultz did not sign this letter under her real name suggests a new level of press 
scrutiny in Germany. She only used the name John Dickson to disassociate herself from critical 
articles in order to protect her identity in Berlin. Clearly, the information provided in this letter 
worried Schultz enough to risk using her other name in order to hide her authorship.  
In the letter, Schultz relayed how correspondents were viewed with more suspicion in 
Germany which put not only them, but also their friends and other acquaintances in jeopardy. 
She mentioned how some friends in November told her that McCormick’s “Berlin correspondent 
was under military suspicion.”307 Most likely, Schultz was relaying information about herself in 
order to communicate how her position was being compromised. She stated that the Berlin 
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correspondents’ friends and casual acquaintances were being cross-examined by the German 
government. She contributed her trouble to her reporting news that was considered as restricted 
German military information. Unfortunately, she does not discuss the article that caused the 
problem with the German military. By the end of the letter, Schultz questioned if she should still 
attempt to report from Germany. She described that “[correspondents] run up against things that 
[were] so incredible, it seems useless to write about them, because the casual reader far away 
[would] think they [were] inspired by prejudice or hate and simply won’t believe them.”308 
However, this self-doubt did not stop herself from still reporting. She ends her letter with the 
statement “I don’t think that I am allowing the black side of things to affect my determinations to 
be as factual as humanly possible.”309 Schultz understood what type of risk she was taking by 
remaining in Germany. More importantly, this was a shared risk by any correspondent that dared 
to be critical.   
To Sigrid Schultz’s credit, many of her articles kept the same critical tone against the 
Nazis and were well informed about the current situation in Germany and the rest of Europe.
310
 
An illustrative case in point is her article on May 17, 1940 that discussed how “idle” German 
women were seen as traitors.
311
 From 1939 to 1941, the German Labor Front attempted to 
increase the women labor force in the arms industry to improve the labor shortages brought 
about by the draft.
312
 The way Schultz’s worded this article showed that the unemployed German 
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women may have been highly criticized. Her title literally stated, “Idle Women are Traitors.”313 
Schultz also used several quotes in local German magazine that described how “no women has 
the right to object for the sake of her own wellbeing while soldiers are dying for her.”314 
Magazine and other local sources were strictly under the control of the Nazis party, which meant 
Schultz quoted the German government’s position. Clearly, Schultz wanted to show that the 
German government was attempting to pressure women into their war plans.  
One should note that Schultz’s description of German labor was not entirely accurate. 
The Germans were starting to use foreign labors in large numbers from countries such as Poland 
and Italy in May of 1940 to fill the void left by the men.
315
 Schultz may not have recognized this 
based on her position in Berlin and had no additional evidence contrary to the magazines and the 
German women’s situation. This does not mean that Schultz’s critical nature in this article 
should be ignored. It also showed she still had the capacity of producing critical and inform 
above articles about Germany’s situation. 
Another example of Schultz’s famous critical writing was her article published on May 
22, 1940 that predicted a German attack on England. The attack was not the important part of 
this article, but rather Schultz’s explanation of why Germany was most likely preparing for one. 
Schultz wrote that “German astrologists have predicted that the planet Mercury, which they take 
to represent England will go thru [sic] terrific crises starting Thursday.”316  She continued on to 
describe how “the star gazers have forecast the end of the war on June 4” and Hitler’s interest in 
the study of the stars for the last several years.
317
 Schultz painted a picture of a military leader 
dependent on the stars and constellations for his war plans. The Chicago Tribune editors seemed 
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to support Schultz’s conclusions, because this article appeared on the front page of the 
newspaper. The nature of these articles suggest that Schultz still had some way to communicate 
her uncensored articles, but in her letter she showed how reporting was becoming impossible.  
Ultimately, Schultz’s undoing in Germany cannot be fully attributed to the Nazis and 
German press rules. The Nazis’ strict control over information and press’s rights were definitely 
a factor, however, an unforeseen problem was the deciding factor. Historian Nancy Caldwell 
Sorel argues that Schultz traveled to Spain in the first place, because she thought the Gestapo 
were preparing to arrest her in Germany. Sorel based her argument on an interview with Schultz 
decades later, but she failed to explain why Schultz wanted to return months later and the story in 
the Tribune about her short vacation.
318
 Schultz decided to go back to the United State by March 
of 1941, but the reason for her leaving Germany and Europe remains unclear.   
One factor may have been her shrapnel wound from the year before that never fully 
healed. She received the wound in 1940, while doing a radio broadcast with CBS Broadcaster, 
William Shirer, in Berlin. A bomb landed on the CBS’s studio, which led to Schultz being hit by 
flying shrapnel.  Schultz was able to finish the radio broadcast with the wound, but it was never 
aired or recorded. The bomb also blew out their radio transmitter, which was their only way to 
broadcast it.
319
  
It was not uncommon for foreign correspondent to do radio broadcasts from Europe. In 
fact, the CBS was starting to set up the first European radio network in the late 1930s in order to 
report breaking news from such places as battles. Edward R. Murrow was one of the leading 
figure behind CBS’s European network. He helped to establish the concept of breaking news and 
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radio’s importance in foreign news reporting.320 As seen with Schultz’s experience, this type of 
journalism had its own challenges for the correspondents in terms of equipment and safety. It 
would be interesting to try to gauge the impact of the radio on foreign news reporting, but this 
falls outside the scope of my study.  
Another factor may have been the typhus she contradicted after she left Germany and 
travel to Spain. For a couple of weeks, she was required to be under hospital care and on bed rest 
in order to become healthily enough for the boat trip back to the US. Most of her recovery was to 
take place in United States, which meant Schultz had to leave Germany and Europe altogether.
321
 
By the beginning of July in 1941, Sigrid Schultz was attempting to return to Germany; however, 
Colonel McCormick would not allow her to return due to the rising tensions and fear for 
Schultz’s safety.322 In the end, Schultz agreed with McCormick’s assessment of the situation in 
Germany. She even admitted that the “[she] never was confident that the Gestapo would let me 
leave if tensions increased much more.”323  
In her letter to Pat Maloney on August 4, 1941, Schultz made a case for her to be sent to 
Portugal or Switzerland to keep reporting on the war news.
324
 She also refused to accept any 
speaking engagements with Jewish organization in order to keep up appearances with the Nazis 
if she ever returned to Germany.
325
 She did, however, not receive such a reporting position and 
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would only returned to Europe in 1945.
326
 Schultz’s leaving and being denied back to Europe 
cannot be explained by focusing on the Nazis’ actions, Colonel McCormick’s opinion, or even 
the fact that she was a women. It was a combination of all three factors and how Schultz’s 
reacted to them that left the readers of the Chicago Tribune without a well-informed reporter in 
Berlin after 1941.  
The Chicago Tribune did not have many other correspondents remaining in Germany 
after Sigrid Schultz had to leave in early 1941. Alex Small, the Chicago Tribune correspondent 
who covered the German invasion of Poland, would report from Germany after she left.
327
 There 
were no other reporters that remained in Germany long enough to write any substantial number 
of articles. After Germany declared war on the United States, Alex Small would become a Nazi 
“prisoner”-possibly an internee- along with other reporters. He was eventually released back to 
the US in May of 1942 with the other internees from Germany.
328
 Overall, the reporting from 
Berlin turned into individual Chicago Tribune reporters attempting to gather what limited news 
was available after 1941.
329
 Their counterparts in the New York Times News Bureau, Otto 
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Tolischus, Frederick Birchall, and Guido Enderis, did not fare much better as Germany and the 
rest of Europe descended into war.  
 The New York Times News Bureaus across Europe started to prepare for war several 
months before the German invasion of Poland in 1939. It should not come as a surprise that the 
New York Times would develop such a plan, because the newspaper was under attack by the 
Nazis since 1933. However, plans could only predict so many of the possible reporting issues. In 
May of 1939, this plan was developed by Frederick Birchall, who clearly thought war was a 
strong possibility at any time. He was the New York Times Chief European Correspondent and 
had his share of run ins with the Nazis over his critical reporting.
330
 Birchall’s plan for the news 
bureaus across Europe was based on his experiences from the previous war. Essentially, the 
individual correspondents would receive direction from the New York’s office, because news 
bureaus would be dissolved or operate with skeleton staffs. Birchall surmised that the 
“Dailygraph System,” which gave the telegraphed directions to the news bureaus, would be no 
longer operational.
331
 He also argued that the Times would have to pay other local new agencies, 
such as the ones in London, to receive the basic news about current events. The news bureaus’ 
chiefs were also required to draft war plans unique to their needs.
332
  
The Berlin Bureau chief, Guido Enderis, did not think a war plan was necessary, because 
he thought Germany would not go to war this year (1939) and that any air attacks would not be 
able to reach Berlin. Therefore, Enderis decided to keep the bureau in its present condition, 
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which Birchall thought was too optimistic. Consequently, Birchall developed his own plan, 
which was to establish a house on the outskirts of Berlin to keep the bureau’s papers safe from 
any attack. He also gave instructions that in the case of war that Enderis would remain in Berlin 
in order to handle official communications, while Otto Tolischus was to take trips to the front 
and Peter Knauth would take care of “minor legwork.”333 In theory, this plan would have worked 
perfectly with the current dynamics of the bureau. Enderis was not writing many of the articles in 
order to help manage the relationship between the German government and New York Times. 
Tolischus and Birchall were writing the majority of the articles from Germany.
334
 However, 
Birchall and the other correspondents would learn quickly that no one could fully plan for war.  
The New York Times Berlin Bureau lost two of its foreign correspondents in Germany, 
Frederick Birchall and Otto Tolischus, within months of Wehrmacht invasion of Poland in 
September of 1939. The war in West was considered to be a “sitting war” due to war planning 
and weather, however, the countries were still considered at war and citizens of respecting 
countries would be enemy aliens.
335
 This meant that Frederick Birchall would not be freely able 
to travel in and out of Germany, because of his British citizenship, which he had not 
renounced.
336
 Therefore, Birchall became a potential enemy alien in Germany with Great 
Britain’s declaration of war in 1939. He would be transferred to Canada for the rest of the war.337 
Otto Tolischus’s expulsion followed Birchall’s shortly afterwards in early 1940. The 
reason why he was expelled was not as clear as in Birchall’s case. Leff attributes Tolischus’s 
                                                 
333
 Memorandum on the Possibilities and Probable Actions of the European Service in the Event of War by 
Frederick Birchall May 30, 1939. 
334
 For more information about Enderis’s role after 1933 see Chapter Two page 52 to 53. 
335
 Overy, Origins of Second World War, 83. 
336
 Leff, Buried in the Times, 62. 
337
 For examples of his articles from Canada see Frederick T. Birchall, “Getting at the Facts Despite the Censor,” 
New York Times, PHN, October 15, 1939; and Frederick T. Birchall, “Canadians Elated by Progress of War at Home 
and in Europe,” New York Times, PHN, December 20, 1939, 8.  
109 
expulsion to his long history of critical articles about the Nazis’ treatment of Jews.338 This is 
most likely true, however, the official reason for his expulsion remains unclear. Leff describes 
that in March of 1940, Tolischus was notified that his reporting permit would not be renewed. 
The German government did say that he could return after six weeks if he left Germany 
immediately, but nothing came of this deal.
339
 It is also difficult to confirm when Tolischus was 
fully expelled, because he remained in Europe in early 1940 following the invading Germans in 
Denmark and Norway. This would have required him to have some form of governmental 
approval to remain on the front and safe.
340
 Most correspondents considered this a privilege, 
because one would need German military approval.
341
 Clearly, Tolischus or the New York Times 
had some pull with the German military when the war began in September of 1939, because 
otherwise Tolischus would not be able to follow the army.  
Most likely, the Nazis wanted to expel any remaining critical journalists in a quiet 
manner in order to protect the flow of information before the real fighting started with France 
and Great Britain. Tolischus’s writing would fall under the category of critical journalism. Case 
in point, his front page article on September 8, 1939 described how the German press was 
molding the image of its invasion of Poland.
342
 Tolischus suggested that the press and the army 
command were ignoring French and British reports of artillery battles. He argued that “the press, 
by virtue of its own glowing accounts of German victories and on the basis of testimony by the 
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allied Italian press, whose correspondents are the only foreign writers permitted to see the front 
line action, says Poland is in chaos and predicts her collapse within a few days.”343 Further on in 
his article, Tolischus wrote, “despite the speed of the German advance and the claims of the 
press, German military quarters admit that the bulk of the Polish Army, while retreating, is still 
unbroken.”344 The way Tolischus phrased his information about official and press accounts 
placed them under some serious doubt. The German government would not want this type of 
critical journalist remaining in Germany, where they could cause trouble by voicing negative 
opinions about its domestic actions to foreign countries.  
Nevertheless, the Germans would not want to expel publicly an American journalist like 
Otto Tolischus without a reason. This would create an international issue with the United States, 
which the Nazis were not keen on due to war. It makes sense that the German government would 
simply lie to Tolischus about the possibility of him coming back to Germany after six weeks.
345
 
This would push Tolischus out of Germany without much of a fuss and would allow him not 
return to Germany. Leff asserts that he followed the advancing German army into Denmark in 
1940 and then was transferred to Japan in order to cover the growing tension in the Pacific. She 
also states that, “after Pearl Harbor, he was arrested and spent much of the war in Japanese 
captivity.”346  
There was no clear reason why he decided to move to those specific countries. Most 
likely, it was one of the last havens for correspondents to produce news without governmental 
interference.  An article by Associated Press in March 1940 described how an air mail service 
was needed in Finland and Netherlands for American correspondents to get around the British 
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and French censorship.
347
 As already discussed, Schultz used Copenhagen, Denmark to 
telephone her articles in the 1940s. Overall, Tolischus’s experience in Germany was, yet another 
example of the German government silencing a reporter for the country’s safety. This was not a 
rare occurrence in Germany as seen with Tolischus’s and Schutlz’s experiences.   
This left the Berlin Bureau with Guido Enderis, Peter Knauth, and C. Brooks Peters to 
report the news.
348
 This staff would not give the New York Times much leeway in terms of 
reporting. Enderis wrote about 46 articles from 1939 to 1941, which averages to about 15 articles 
a year.
349
 Again, there was no clear explanation for why Enderis basically stopped writing. Most 
likely, it still relates back to his role of keeping the peace between the New York Times and the 
German government. This job probably became more difficult for Enderis, which was evident by 
Tolischus and Birchall not being allowed back into Germany. This left the New York Times with 
Knauth and Peters who were both novice reporters.
350
 
From 1939 to 1941, Knauth only had 52 front page articles with the Times, while Peters 
had 55. Most of Knauth’s and Peters’ work can be compared to that of the Associated Press, 
because their articles’ main intention seemed to be focused on providing basic information about 
Germany. For example, Knauth wrote an article on May 27, 1940 about the fighting near Dover, 
which only described the military situation.
351
 This fighting was part of a larger battle of 
Dunkirk, which was happening in France. The German army surrounded over 200,000 British 
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and French soldiers in Northern France and continued to pick them off by air plane attacks. 
Some of them were only saved by a quick evacuation.
352
 Knauth’s focus was to explain the 
possible war plans for each side. Throughout this article, he does not draw any possible 
conclusions about the war or how either side was waging it.
353
  
Another one of his articles on September 2, 1940 reported based on official reports how 
Germany remained unharmed after the British air attack.
354
 It does not matter if the attack 
reached Berlin or even happened, but the fact Knauth mainly used the official report by the Nazis 
was important in the article. The Nazis could have easily been lying in the reports in order to 
keep the home front calm and peaceful. The foreign correspondents’ sources dictated what story 
news could be written. Knauth’s article simply provided the official findings and nothing else.    
 C. Brooks Peters’s articles were not a large improvement on Knauth’s reporting. Many of 
his articles also used local German sources; however, Peters was more careful with them. For 
instance, Peters also wrote an article on September 12, 1940 about the British bombings in 
Berlin. He used the German press to show the German reaction to the bombing. One of his 
example headlines was “London Carries on Its Crazy Game to the End--Reichstag and American 
Embassy Bombed--Again Five Victims in Berlin Quarters.”355 Peters explained how the press 
wanted to foster American anger by emphasizing that the bombs hit the United States Embassy. 
Peters’s evidence from the German press would not shed light on everything occurring in 
Germany, but it provided some idea how the German government wanted to portray the events. 
He even ended his article with a quote, “The German press promises that ‘the British will now 
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feel the sword with all its sharpness.”356 At the very least, Peters showed that the general 
sentiment in Germany towards Great Britain and how recent events were molded for the German 
public. It remains unclear whether or not these reporters continued to work after the US entered 
the war or what happened to them.
357
 His article cannot be compared to Schultz or Tolischus 
writing, because each journalists were at different points of their careers. More importantly, 
Knauth and Peters were facing an impossible situation under the wartime press rules. The official 
sources may have been their only option.  
 The lack of critical articles by Knauth and Peters was not completely their fault. Most 
likely, their comparative inexperience did not provide them with enough knowledge to work 
around the Nazis press system in order to gain a fuller picture. This may also have been to their 
advantage, because the most experienced journalists like Sigrid Schultz were slowly being 
expelled or forced out of Germany. The Germans would want inexperienced reporters, because it 
was easier to influence their writing. At the very least, the American public was provided with 
some information from Berlin. In the end, the youth of the remaining correspondents and 
Enderis’s relationship would not keep the New York Times Berlin News Bureau open after 
Germany declared war on the United States at the end of 1941. Like the British and French 
correspondents, they were now considered enemy aliens for Germany and had to close their 
news bureau’s doors. This left individual correspondents on their own in Germany as freelance 
journalists with the choice to leave or stay at their own risk.
358
 
 The foreign correspondents in Germany were not the only ones heavily affected by the 
start of the war. Correspondents all across Europe were subjected to new rules or at the very least 
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thrown into new roles by their newspapers once the war began. Essentially, Europe experienced 
a reshuffling of its communication network based on the tide of war. Some country like Sweden 
and Finland remained relatively censor-free and welcoming of correspondents for a short time, 
while others quickly tightened their control over information.
359
 It was up to the correspondents 
to understand how their communication networks changed based on their location. More 
importantly, they needed to decide if they should leave their host country due to the pressures of 
war. This can only be traced by examining how correspondents moved around Europe and 
attempted to send reports back to the United States. The correspondents’ movements dictated 
what events were described in their respective newspapers, and, ultimately, influenced what was 
written for the general American public.   
 Unfortunately, there is not enough information about the correspondents’ situation in 
France or Great Britain to come to any definitive conclusion. Many correspondents were 
stationed in both of the countries until Germany declared war on the United States and even in 
some cases well beyond 1941. In fact, many of these correspondents fled to France and England 
after German invasion of Poland in order to remain safe while reporting the news.
360
 There was a 
steady stream of articles being sent by the correspondents that suggests a basic communication 
structure remained intact. This does not mean the correspondents were not under some stress.   
The few documents available suggest that an incident occurred with the New York Times 
in Paris after it fell to Germany. The New York Times had to close quickly their World Wide 
                                                 
359
 For examples of a journalists publishing in Sweden and Finland see Alex Small, “Retreat of Nazi Army in Poland 
Told by Writer,” Chicago Tribune, PHN, October 20, 1939, 7; Alex Small, “Poland’s Train at Standstill in Wake of 
Bombing,” Chicago Tribune, PHN, October 11, 1939, 4; Donald Day, “Reds Call Finns to Discuss Deal on Nickel 
Mines,” Chicago Tribune, PHN, January 28, 1941, 2; Donald Day, “Finns ‘Unmask’ Bolshevism as ‘Great 
Swindle,’” Chicago Tribune, PHN, August 25, 1941, 7. 
360
 For the list of New York Times’s correspondents in London see Leff, Buried in the Times, xiv-xv. For some 
examples of Chicago Tribune correspondents’ articles in England see Larry Rue, Front Page- No Title, Chicago 
Tribune, PHN, July 9, 1941, 1; Captain M.M. Corpening, “Life in London! How It Clicks,” Chicago Tribune, PHN, 
October 19, 1940, 1; Joseph Cerutti, “Britain Orders 120,000 Children to Leave London,” Chicago Tribune, PHN, 
June 10, 1940, 8. 
115 
photo offices in France on October 14, 1940 in order to protect its business interests and 
products. The letter does not clearly explain why the New York Times correspondents and other 
employees needed to close its office’s doors. The author, C.M.C, seemed more worried about the 
Germans forcing him to reopen their doors despite the cost to the Times.
361
 A month later, a 
telegram arrived in Washington D.C. from an unknown author that discussed how the Germans 
took the Times’s whole collection of photographs without any reason.362 These two documents 
cannot allow a definitive conclusion about the press’s situation in France; however, they do 
suggest that more research needs to be done. More importantly, it also suggests what type of 
pressure and arbitrariness correspondents had to face in German occupied territories. 
 The foreign correspondents that found themselves in the middle of a German invasion 
faced challenging communication issues. Some of the Chicago Tribune correspondents in 
Eastern Europe had to move in order to send reports, because of their lack of access to 
communication outlets due to military advances. Alex Small’s experience in Poland during the 
German invasion in September of 1939 is an illustrative case. He was assigned to Poland in early 
1939, because Donald Day who was assigned to the region could not enter the country.
363
 This 
led to Small being one of the last foreign correspondents to leave Poland after the German 
invasion.
364
 He had to flee with the other foreign refugees in Poland and could not communicate 
with the Chicago Tribune for some of the time until he left Poland He was only able to publish 
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three stories in September from Poland before the German army cut off the communication lines 
out of Poland. Shortly after his last story on September 11, 1939, the Chicago Tribune lost 
contact with Small.
365
. Therefore, most of his articles could not be published until well after the 
fact, namely in October 1939 when he arrived in Amsterdam.
366
 This led to his stories becoming 
more of a human-interest story, because of the delay in time from his situation with the war.  
This created an unfortunate situation where most of Small’s eyewitness accounts did not 
appeared on the Chicago Tribune front page and were published weeks after the event in a series 
of articles in early October.
367
 Small stated that this city was still allowing censor-free 
communication, which was needed for his articles. Based on them, it cannot be certain whether 
Small wrote his articles in Poland during the invasion or after he arrived in Amsterdam. The only 
evidence that he may have written them during his travels was the statement in an article about 
his luggage consisting of half a typewriter. The other part was with a friend with whom he 
traveled through Poland.
368
  
 Nevertheless, Small’s articles are an example of what happens to a correspondent if their 
host country crumbles underneath their feet. He had to make several choices about his reporting 
that were directly connected to his safety. On September 11, 1939, Small published an article 
from Poland in which he stated that foreign correspondents were not allowed at the front, but he 
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still thought about going towards the story on the front and not fleeing to safety with the French 
and English.
369
 In another article on October 12, he described how on his journey out of Poland 
he was almost arrested and killed as a spy, because he appeared to be German to a Polish 
officer.
370
 In article on October 13, 1939, Small made a clear point of avoiding the Soviet line by 
stating “on no condition would we fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks without a struggle.”371 
The choices made by Small were heavily influenced by how he perceived his current situation in 
Poland. He was unable to receive any directions from editors or Colonel McCormick on how to 
proceed, which meant Small was effectively on his own in a middle of an invasion. Therefore, he 
had full control over what he reported back as the last foreign correspondent to leave Poland.  
 After 1940, reporters’ actions had little effect on what they could report on from Poland. 
The Chicago Tribune and New York Times information on Poland dwindled down to almost 
nothing by 1940, which was when it became most important to the American public. The foreign 
correspondents had to leave for their safety, which made Poland almost a complete black zone 
for journalism during the war. Alex Small was the only correspondent from the Tribune who 
would go back into Poland for a twenty-four-hour tour by the Nazis on March 12, 1941.
372
 He 
described how the tour showcased the German propaganda intent and official story, which was 
the only direct information coming out of Poland. This meant Small had no choice, but to report 
that story and acknowledge the influence of the state. Unfortunately, German-occupied Poland 
was not the only place where journalism was guided by the government.  
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 The correspondents in Moscow and surrounding Eastern Europe countries constantly had 
to move around based on the conditions of war. The Chicago Tribune correspondent Donald Day 
was forced out of his news headquarters in Latvia by the Soviet Union in 1940.
373
 Day was 
stationed in Latvia because he was not allowed to report from the Soviet Union. It never 
approved his visa and the reason for the denial remains unclear. He claimed the Soviets did not 
like his critical reporting on communism and his failure to submit to their censorship; however, 
this was only his opinion.
374
 The important aspect to note is that Day thought he had to leave 
Latvia for his safety after the Soviet Union increased its pressure on the country for him to leave. 
Like many other reporters, he decided to flee to Finland because it was quickly emerging as a 
safe haven for correspondents from 1939 to 1941.
375
 This effectively left the Chicago Tribune 
without any reporters in Eastern Europe for most of the war.  
 The New York Times’s experience with the Soviet Union was not much different, 
however, the issue stemmed from the correspondents’ inability to work under Soviet rules. 
G.E.R. Gedye was the New York Times correspondent assigned to Moscow in 1939 after he was 
expelled by the Germans from first Vienna and then Prague in 1938. Leff argues that he was sent 
to Moscow, because Sulzberger wanted to cure him of his “left political leanings.” The question 
of political bias could not be solved; however, Leff asserts Gedyre had great difficulties 
reporting from Russia due to his lack of understanding the Russian culture and language. This 
led to the Times’s publisher, Arthur Sulzberger, debating about the value of having a Moscow 
News Bureau.
376
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By early 1940, New York Times editor Edwin James sent a letter to Arthur Sulzberger 
about Gedye’s inability to report the news from Moscow. He argued that Gedye let the story die 
instead of pushing them through the Soviet censorship.
377
 Gedye asserted that it was impossible 
to report as Soviet censorship did not allow the reporters to send the full story.
378
 The New York 
Times asked their freelancer Walter Duranty to write a report about the situation in Moscow. He 
concluded that the situation is not impossible; however, Gedye did not attitude to work with the 
Soviet Union. It is also important to note that historians characterized Duranty’s reporting as 
highly influenced by the Soviet Union and often adapted its point of view. This influence could 
have affected his assessment of the situation and Gedye.
379
 Leff describes how Gedye would 
leave the New York Times for unclear reasons by the end 1940. This caused the Times to close its 
Moscow News Bureau until they found a replacement journalists in 1941.
380
  
 The correspondents across Europe did not face the same kinds of pressures from the war; 
however, the solution remained consistent among the correspondents. When the war began, all of 
the correspondents needed to find reliable communication networks in order to keep reporting 
from Europe. This required the correspondents to leave their host countries, which in most cases 
required travel to Sweden or Denmark. The correspondents had to find neutral or relatively 
stable countries in order to report the news back to the US, because these countries had 
communication outlets. This would severely limit what news correspondents could report on, 
which shaped what was provided to the general American public.  
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 The choices made by correspondents from 1939 to 1941 appear to be small when 
considering how a newspaper was published. However, correspondents provide the foundation 
for the newspaper to inform the American public about the war. This means that the 
correspondents’ reporting played a crucial role in how the general American public viewed the 
events developing in Europe. A perfect correspondent did not exist in this time period. Much of 
their reporting capabilities were dependent purely on luck and on their individual situation. More 
importantly, the way reporters reacted to their situation dictated what type of reports were sent 
back to the United States.  
Some correspondents decided to work within their host country’s rules in order to remain 
welcome. Others decided to challenge the rules as long as possible, before the country found a 
way to expel them. The correspondents were not wrong choosing either one of these paths; 
however, it is important to realize that the correspondents decided their path based on their 
perception of the current situation. Once the war began, newspaper owners and their editors 
could only influence their correspondents to a certain point, because communication was limited. 
The deciding factor was how the correspondent reacted to their host countries’ press rules. This 
choice and perception would cause a ripple effect onto the front page of the newspapers and into 
the eyes of their readers.  
On December 7, 1941, the foreign correspondents’ situation completely changed along 
with the rest of the United States. On this day Japan executed a decisive attack on the United 
States’ naval base at Pearl Harbor. Germany declared war on the United States on December 11 
to help support its Japanese allies. This effectively changed the correspondents into enemies of 
the state and removed any protection left for the correspondent, because they are no longer 
121 
connected or from a neutral country. The remaining correspondents had the choice of remaining 
at their post with the constant threat of danger or leaving Europe for safer grounds.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: THE UNSEEN GATEKEEPER OF INFORMATION
381
 
I feel very odd to be entering the era of Government-controlled journalism.  
It is my first experience. I was a Managing Editor in the last war, and 
 we had a wide field for the exercise of our own judgement.
382
 
 -Arthur Krock (New York Times News Bureau Chief) on December 19,1941 
  
 December 11, 1941 is often referred to as the day when World War II turned into a true 
world conflict, because Germany declared war on the United States. This was the start of a 
watershed moment that would change the entire world, and it also ushered in a new era of 
journalism. In a general sense, the world became aware of the media’s role in influencing public 
opinion. The countries could not afford their respective publics’ opinion to turn against the war, 
because it would be impossible to wage a successful war without a supportive home front. It 
makes logical sense that any government would take steps to influence the media for their own 
goals. Nevertheless, this era did not develop over night or became common governmental policy 
after December of 1941; it was preceded by a decade of changes to press rules. 
 The changes to journalism can only be seen by studying the foreign correspondents’ 
agency in publishing the news during the 1930s, because the new press rules affected how they 
could write about Europe. This case study of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune foreign 
correspondents in Europe illustrate how a highly complicated system of foreign news reporting 
emerged due to the steady stream of new governmental rules on reporting in the 1930s. It should 
be noted that the correspondents across Europe did not face the same press challenges. The type 
of press rules was highly dependent on their individual locations. The correspondents’ ability to 
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face each of them partially shaped what information was available about Europe to the American 
public; thus, placing them in the gatekeeper role of information. The rest of the responsibility 
laid with the editors who placed their individual articles into the newspaper.  
 Between 1930 to 1934, correspondents stationed in Germany were one of the few who 
had to contend with governmental press rules. The Chicago Tribune Berlin correspondent Sigrid 
Schultz’s experience is the best example of how a government attempted to influence foreign 
correspondents’ writing, because her reporting very early on brought her into conflict with the 
German government. The fact that her reporting was an issue for the German government 
showed how governments were paying more attention to the media at the start of the 1930s. An 
illustrative case was how the Weimar government attempted to stop Adolf Hitler from 
interviewing with the press to keep him from becoming more popular with the masses. Schultz’s 
connections in Germany allowed her to get an interview with Hitler in 1931. She was also able to 
critically write about Hitler’s intention for Germany in order to provide one of the earliest 
warnings about him. Unfortunately, this article and many others like it never reached the front 
page of the newspaper.
383
 The German government attempts to regulate the press, especially in 
regards to Hitler, may have been well-intentioned, but set a bad precedent for later regimes.    
 The correspondents in Germany only had a brief transition period, while the Nazis 
consolidated their power from 1933 to 1934. The correspondents’ situation changed by the end 
of 1934 to where their reporting directly influenced their safety. They were faced with a choice 
of working with the German press rules or facing governmental repercussions. There was a 
strong possibility of the reporters being expelled or, even worse, arrested by the Gestapo. A 
journalist should not be completely defined by their decision to work with the Germans on their 
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press rules, because both of the choices had their merits for foreign reporting. It is the agency of 
the reporter to choose which path would work best for their situation and reporting. 
Laurel Leff argues that the New York Times had a fragile relationship with the Germans, 
because its owner and publisher was Jewish. Essentially, it already had a strike against it due to 
the German anti-Jewish policies.
384
 Leff underestimates the New York Times Berlin Bureau chief, 
Guido Enderis, role in protecting this relationship. After 1934, Enderis started to develop a 
working relationship with the Germans. The details of this relationship remain unclear; however, 
the value of it can be seen in how Enderis negotiated for New York Times other correspondents to 
stay in Germany.
385
 Leff describes several instances in which Enderis protected Frederick 
Birchall and Otto Tolischus, who were some of the most critical foreign journalists of the Third 
Reich.
386
 Their articles in the 1930s would not have been published had Enderis not assumed this 
role of negotiator with the Germans. Most likely, the New York Times would have been closed 
down if this fragile relationship with the Germans had not been fostered.  
This relationship began to collapse after the war began in September of 1939. The New 
York Times had two of its stronger correspondent, Frederick Birchall and Otto Tolischus, 
expelled from Germany. This left them with Enderis, who barely reported any news, and two 
young, naive reporters. After 1940, the Times articles from Berlin decreased dramatically and 
turned into mostly simple news reports about the war and Europe; however, the bureau remained 
open until Germany declared war on the United States.
387
 Enderis’s role should not be 
underestimated, because his relationship on some level helped the Times to remain open in an 
impossible situation.  
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 The other choice for journalists was to work around the German press rules; however, 
this could be dangerous for the correspondent and their acquaintances. Sigrid Schultz became 
famous among journalists for her ability to work with the German system and as one of the most 
knowledgeable correspondents in the country, which showed through in her critical articles about 
the Third Reich. She had the abilities to work around the German press rules, because of her 
European upbringing and journalistic drive.
388
 Case in point, she had multiple acquaintances with 
higher Nazis officials, such as Herman Göring. She was also good friends with the American 
Ambassador William Dodd.
389
 This allowed her to gain access to confidential information that 
would not have been presented at the daily German press conferences. 
 Throughout the 1930s, Schultz had to change her reporting methods in order to keep 
writing, because German press rules tightened. Essentially, the German government wanted to 
have control over the flow of information through any means necessary. Schultz avoid some of 
its control by leaving Germany to send articles from Prague back to the United States; however, 
after 1939 many of her communication lines became useless due to the war.
390
 Many of the 
European correspondents first fled to Denmark and Sweden, because communication outlets 
were still uncensored and efficient in sending messages.
391
 This changed after the German 
invasion of Denmark in early 1940, which made it a German-occupied territory. Sweden remain 
neutral; however, it had a working relationship with the Germans.
392
 Ultimately, this forced 
correspondents to fled towards countries such as Great Britain that were not under German 
control. She also used a different byline to distance herself from her critical articles using the 
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male alias of John Dickson. This is also a commentary on gender in reporting. It made more 
sense for an editor to place her most critical articles under a male name.
393
 These were only two 
of the many changes she made to her reporting; however, they could only keep Schultz safe in 
Germany for so long. 
Schultz was not able to remain in Germany much after the start of 1941 and it was not 
from a lack of drive or knowledge to remain under the radar from the Nazis. The reason for her 
leaving has not been fully explained, but in the months beforehand she had received multiple 
threats from the Germans. As Schultz chose to write around the German press rules, she was in 
constant conflict with the German government and risking her safety. Throughout the 1930s, 
Schultz was able to work in the German press system, which allowed her to produce a constant 
stream of critical article.  
The correspondents described above were only two examples discussed throughout the 
study. All of the correspondents who were highlighted had unique approaches to reporting the 
news that shaped what type of news their editors placed in the newspaper. The foreign 
correspondents were forced throughout the 1930s to make choices based on their individual 
situations that influenced what news was reported back to the American public. It is important to 
understand how the correspondents decided to report and their respective problems, because their 
varying experiences illustrate the development of a new governmental journalism system and 
their agency within publishing the news.  
  Ultimately, the importance of journalists’ agency never faded after the end of the war. It 
is even more crucial today when the new administration describes the media as “enemy of the 
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American people.”394 The journalists are the ones who attempt to interpret events and to provide 
information for the public. In the 1930s, the foreign correspondents in Europe faced varying 
governmental attempts to influence their reporting. The way they decided to work with their 
respective governments dictated their role in publishing the news and his continues to be the case 
for journalists then and now.   
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